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In a number of countries, especially emerging
market economies, the public sector has in
recent years been accumulating sizeable cross-
border financial assets, mainly in the form of
official foreign exchange reserves. World
reserves have risen from USD 1.2 trillion in
January 1995 to above USD 4 trillion in
September 2005, growing particularly rapidly
since 2002. The impressive pace of reserve
growth has become an important issue on the
international policy agenda and has been
considered from various perspectives,
including the financing of the growing US
current account deficits, the debate on high net
savings in the Asian economies and oil-
exporting countries, the sustainability of
reserve accumulation, and the factors behind
exceptionally low yields within and outside the
United States.
In January 2005 the International Relations
Committee (IRC), a committee established by
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)
to deal with international monetary and
financial affairs, asked a group of ESCB
central bank experts to study the accumulation
of foreign reserves in greater detail. The
ensuing report by the IRC task force
investigated the features, drivers, risks and
costs of reserve accumulation, as well as the
other uses that certain countries have been
making of their accumulated foreign assets.
The report also reviewed the main trends in
central bank reserve management and provided
some evidence for the impact of reserve
accumulation on yields and asset prices.
The report – on which this occasional paper is
based1 – was discussed by the IRC in June
2005, and the authors gratefully acknowledge
the comments made by the Committee
members on that occasion. In addition, in
September 2005 the report was sent to the
General Council of the European Central
Bank (ECB) and, subsequently, to the
Economic and Financial Committee, a
consultative committee that contributes to the
preparation of the work of the ECOFIN
Council.
1 Georges Pineau (ECB) chaired the IRC task force and
coordinated its work. Ettore Dorrucci (ECB) drafted the
paper, and the other task force members carried out the
corresponding background studies as acknowledged in the
footnotes to each of the seven annexes.6
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World foreign exchange reserves grew from
USD 1.2 trillion in January 1995 to more than
USD 4.0 trillion in September 20052. Reserve
accumulation in this period exhibited four
features that seem largely unprecedented.
Three of these features became particularly
prominent in 2002-04. First, world reserves
grew by around 85% (or 91% if the first eight
months of 2005 are included), at a pace three
times faster than in 1999-2001. Second,
monetary authorities in Asia, including Japan
until March 2004, accounted for the bulk of the
accumulation, and eight of them are currently
among the ten largest reserve holders. Third,
fewer official creditors held an increasingly
larger share of the total accumulation. The top
five reserve accumulating central banks, which
accounted for almost 57% of the total reserve
accumulation on average in the period 1995-
2001, increased their share to more than 68% of
the total world accumulation in 2004. The top
two, Japan and China, accounted for about half
of the total world accumulation in 2002-04, and
currently hold around 40% of the total world
stock of reserves. A fourth, equally important
development has come about more recently:
the oil-exporting countries, whose combined
current account surplus is estimated to have
exceeded that of the Asian economies in 2005,
have emerged as a new major group of net
capital exporters in the world economy. They,
however, have accumulated assets not only in
the form of “traditional” reserves, but also by
building up foreign assets in so-called oil funds
– a phenomenon that is not yet fully captured by
the available statistics, including those on the
financing of the US external deficit.
Such an unprecedented accumulation of
official foreign assets can be seen as the
outcome of three main drivers in addition to the
more recent oil price hike. First, in the
aftermath of the financial crises that occurred
in the 1990s and early 2000s, many emerging
market economies (EMEs) felt the need to self-
insure against future crises. Second, at the
beginning of their recoveries and following
strong depreciation of their currencies, the
crisis-hit Asian economies pursued export-led
growth supported by exchange rate regimes
anchoring their currency, de jure or de facto,
to the US dollar. Third, certain features of
the domestic financial systems of EMEs,
especially in Asia, are likely to have played
a role. Such characteristics relate mainly to:
(i) their underdeveloped local financial
systems, entailing difficulties in properly
channelling domestic private savings to
investment as well as inefficient and/or costly
hedging markets; (ii) the resultant tendency
towards dollarisation of official and/or private
cross-border assets on the part of certain
creditor EMEs; and  (iii) from a macro
viewpoint, an excess of domestic savings over
investment driven by either a savings glut
(e.g. China) or an investment drought (other
Asian emerging market economies). All these
features have significant links to reserve
accumulation, as explained below.
These recent drivers of reserve accumulation
seem to have one aspect in common, namely the
role played by the build-up of official foreign
assets both as an outcome of and an instrument
for integration of the EMEs concerned into the
global financial markets. Several emerging
countries, especially in Asia, have in fact
become major players in international trade but
are still underdeveloped from a financial angle.
This asymmetry is probably one reason why
EMEs now hold around two-thirds of world
reserves compared with less than 30% at the
end of the Bretton Woods period in the early
1970s, whereas the total reserves of mature
economies with complete and deep financial
markets, excluding Japan, have remained
stable at around USD 500 billion since the early
1990s.
As underlined in the literature, continued
reserve accumulation may over time entail some
2 As reported by the IMF in its latest update of the database on
Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange
Reserves. In the remainder of this paper, however, data are
updated until the end of August 2005, when world reserves
stood at USD 3.9 trillion.8
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risks and costs, such as inflationary pressure,
over-investment, asset bubbles, complications
in the management of monetary policy,
potentially sizeable capital losses on monetary
authorities’ balance sheets, sterilisation costs,
segmentation of the public debt market and
misallocation of domestic banks’ lending.
Two other noteworthy developments have been
recorded in several economies in recent years.
First, some progress has been made towards
more active management of official reserves,
resulting, for instance, in investment in a more
diversified range of instruments with longer
maturities. Second, a substantial share of
official foreign assets has been channelled into
vehicles with purposes other than reserve
holding. Examples include (i) the creation of
oil funds in countries such as Norway, Russia,
Venezuela, Kuwait and Oman, which aim to
either stabilise their oil revenues (stabilisation
funds) or save part of them for future
generations (savings funds) or for early
reimbursement of foreign debt; (ii) the
establishment of “heritage funds” which have
more explicit return objectives in economies
such as Singapore; (iii) the injection of USD 60
billion from reserve assets into three major
state-owned commercial banks in China in
order to increase their capital base for their
partial privatisation; and (iv) the allocation of
USD 15 billion to banks in the Taiwan Province
of China (hereinafter called Taiwan) for use in
major domestic investment projects. The
effects of these innovative ways of using
official foreign assets are still to be fully
understood, in particular with regard to the link
between exchange rate and fiscal policy (e.g. in
Russia), between the macroeconomic and the
micro-prudential dimension of economic
policy (e.g. in China), and between the
management of very liquid, low-risk assets at
central bank level and the management of
longer-term, more return-oriented portfolios
by other financial entities (e.g. in Singapore).
Regarding the impact of reserve accumulation
on yields, in the existing literature the
estimates of the effect of foreign exchange
intervention on US Treasury yields are quite
different, and range from negligible to 200
basis points. This paper shows that purchases
of US government debt securities by Asian
monetary authorities might have affected the
level and dynamics of their yields; in
particular, there is some evidence that Japanese
purchases of US Treasuries might have had an
impact of around 65 basis points on three-year
US Treasury yields at the time of the most
sizeable interventions. Looking forward, the
overall market impact of portfolio changes
could differ, depending on the preferences of
the private sector.
In conclusion, a significant share of the US
current account deficits is financed by foreign
official institutions pursuing objectives that
are, to some extent, insensitive to risk-return
considerations. However, EMEs could
progressively lessen their need for reserve
accumulation by developing policies such as:
(i) structural and macroeconomic measures to
foster domestic demand; (ii) financial system
reforms both at domestic and regional levels,
including bond market development; (iii) a
well-sequenced shift towards greater exchange
rate flexibility, coupled with money market
reforms and, possibly, financial account
liberalisation; (iv) regional economic
surveillance and monetary cooperation which,
ceteris paribus, would reduce the need for
unilateral reserve accumulation.
1 THE PUZZLE OF RESERVE ACCUMULATION
SINCE 2002
The accumulation of world foreign exchange
reserves (hereinafter called reserves)3 has
exhibited largely unprecedented features since
2002 with respect to: (i) the size and pace of the
accumulation, (ii) the degree of concentration
of ownership, and (iii) the geographical
distribution.
3 For further evidence, see Annex 1. In this paper the
expression “reserves” always refers to foreign exchange
reserves – i.e. reserves net of gold, special drawing rights
(SDR) and reserve positions at the IMF – unless otherwise
specified.9
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First, while world reserves more than tripled in
the past ten years, they have almost doubled in
the last four years alone, with the rate of
accumulation increasing dramatically since
2002. World reserves have in fact grown from
USD 1.2 trillion in January 1995 to more than
USD 4.0 trillion in September 2005 (according
to the latest data for 2005 made available by
the IMF)4, but the pace varied significantly
throughout the period. Between 1995 and 2001,
the financial crises affecting a number of EMEs
in a context of increasingly liberalised capital
flows, and the ensuing need to use reserves and
then replenish them as self-insurance against
future crises, were important factors. However,
in 1997-98, in particular, global reserves
increased by just USD 76 billion, with crisis-
hit countries considerably reducing their
foreign assets (see Table 1). Conversely, world
reserves grew significantly – by around 30% –
in 1995-96 and 1999-2001. In 1995-96 this
growth was mainly driven by the interventions
of China and Japan, which accounted for 14%
and 26% of world reserve growth respectively.
In 1999-2001, the desire for self-insurance
gained momentum among reserve
accumulators; in particular, the reserves lost in
1997-98 were replenished by the ASEAN-5
economies5 and Russia. Since January 2002,
however, world reserves have risen by 91%
(i.e. almost USD 2 trillion), which seems
largely unprecedented. In terms of both reserve
holdings and contribution to world reserve
growth, the top three accumulators have been
China, Japan and Taiwan. In the case of a few
countries such as Turkey and, since 2003,
Argentina and Brazil, such moves can still be
interpreted as reserve replenishment, but in
most other cases the rate of accumulation
appears particularly high not only in
comparison with the previous seven years, but
also by historical standards.
Looking back, while world foreign exchange
reserves doubled from USD 16 billion to USD
33 billion in the decade from 1959 to 1969, they
then tripled in just three years, between 1970
and 1972, reflecting large interventions at a
time when the Bretton Woods system was
unravelling. Since the early 1970s, i.e. the end
of Bretton Woods period, reserve assets have
2002–2005 1999–2001 1997–1998 1995–1996
USD Contribution USD Contribution USD Contribution USD Contribution
bn to world bn to world bn to world bn to world
growth (%) growth (%) growth (%) growth (%)
China 536 29.0 67 14.7 36 47.8 50 14.4
Japan 443 24.0 177 39.0 -4 -5.2 91 26.1
Taiwan 130 7.1 30 6.7 2 2.6 -5 -1.5
Russia 114 6.1 26 5.6 -2 -2.8 9 2.6
Korea 102 5.5 49 10.8 21 27.7 8 2.2
India 92 5.0 18 3.9 7 9.4 0 0.0
Malaysia 49 2.7 3 0.7 -1 -1.8 2 0.4
Singapore 41 2.2 1 0.3 -3 -3.4 18 5.2
Algeria 33 1.8 12 2.5 2 2.6 2 0.5
Brazil 19 1.0 2 0.3 -14 -19.0 22 6.2
World 1,849 100 455 100 76 100 349 100
Table 1 Year-on-year changes in foreign exchange reserves and their contribution to global
reserve growth
(January 1995–August 2005)
Sources: IMF and ECB Staff calculations.
4 See the IMF Currency Composition of Official Foreign
Exchange Reserves (COFER) database. In the remainder of
this paper, data are updated until the end of August 2005,
when world reserves stood at USD 3.9 trillion.
5 ASEAN stands for Association of East Asian Nations, the
members of which are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar, Vietnam and the so-called ASEAN-5 countries:
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.10
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multiplied by a factor of 456, a striking
expansion compared with that in the 1950s and
1960s. Yet, despite the very high levels already
reached, reserve accumulation has further
accelerated in very recent years, as shown in
Chart 1.
Post World War II trends contradict the notion
that reserve accumulation is mainly driven by
the prevalence of de jure pegged exchange rate
regimes, since such regimes have decreased
significantly since the 1970s and even more so
since the second half of the 1990s. Over the
past decade, in particular, one third of all
currencies have been independently floating
according to the official IMF classification.
This figure, however, is reduced to less than
10% if actual observed exchange rate
behaviour is taken as the yardstick. A number
of countries are still anchoring their currencies
– not necessarily in the form of traditional pegs,
but also via heavily managed floating – to
either the US dollar or the euro. In particular,
the countries pursuing a de facto tight peg to the
dollar account for around 10% of world GDP at
market prices, while a further set of economies
with a share of world GDP of about 7% have
adopted some form of managed float vis-à-vis
the US currency7.
Second, the degree of concentration of reserve
accumulation has been also increasing over
time. This means that, on the official side, the
financing of the US current account deficit has
become concentrated among increasingly
fewer institutions, at least until 2004 (final
2005 data were not available when this paper
was prepared for publication). The top five
reserve accumulating central banks, which
accounted for 56.9% of total reserve
accumulation in the period 1995-2001, held a
share amounting to 68.4% of world
accumulation in 2004. The top two holders,
Japan and China, accounted for more than half
of the world accumulation between 2002 and
the present day; they currently hold around
40% of the total stock of reserves.
Third, as regards the geographical distribution,
the Asian economies now account for the bulk
of both reserve accumulation and reserve
holdings. The share of world foreign reserves
held by Asian economies grew from 46% in
January 1995 to 64% in August 2005. In
particular, the Asian monetary authorities
accounted for 77% of the increase in the period
2002-05. As a result, eight Asian monetary
authorities are currently among the ten largest
reserve holders, with seven of them owning
more than USD 100 billion (see Table 2 and
Chart 2).
Sizeable foreign asset accumulation has been
also taking place in oil-exporting countries such
as Russia, Algeria and Norway (see Table 2).
While this is generally related to the surge in oil
prices, which has been particularly strong since
2004, Russia also benefited from a remarkable
increase in the volume of its oil exports. In
addition, it should be borne in mind that the IMF
reserve statistics do not include “oil funds”, into
which several governments channel significant
Chart 1 World foreign exchange
reserves: 1945-20051)
(USD trillions)
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mature economies (excl. Japan)
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
6 In this period, world reserves including gold holdings have
multiplied by a factor of “only” 28, if one values gold at the
historical price of SDR 35 per ounce.
7 These figures are based on de facto exchange rate
classifications. Currencies with little or no observed
volatility against an anchor currency are considered to be
tightly pegged, while those with limited volatility are
considered to be managed floaters.11
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parts of their oil revenues. This is the case for
countries such as Venezuela, Kuwait, Oman and,
again, Russia and Norway. The amounts
involved are often far from negligible. For
instance, the market value of the Norwegian
government’s Petroleum Fund amounted to
around 78% of GDP at the beginning of 2005.
The latest figures show that the accumulation of
both reserves and oil fund assets by this group of
countries recorded an even greater rise in 2005,
driven by an overall current account surplus
estimated to have peaked at more than USD 400
billion (almost 1% of world GDP). Conversely,
several non-oil-exporting mature economies
have been shedding reserves, although important
exceptions are Japan until March 2004 (which
carried out large interventions in a deflationary
context) and, to a lesser extent, Denmark (which
intervened in the framework of the EMS and then
ERM II). As Chart 2 shows, the total reserves of
mature economies excluding Japan have
stabilised at around USD 500 billion since the
early 1990s. As a result, the emerging market
and developing economies, which held less than
30% of total world reserves around the time of
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, now
hold around two-thirds (see Chart 1)8. Between
the mid-1980s and 1996 the reserves of this
group of economies broadly trended up
alongside their net private financial inflows.
However, since 1997 the link between these two
variables has weakened somewhat, as Chart 2
suggests. The share of reserves held by Latin
American countries – albeit on the rise,
especially in Mexico and, since 2003, Brazil –
amounted to only 5.4% in December 2004. The
share of African and Middle East countries
remained broadly stable throughout the period
considered. At the end of 2004 these economies
held 7.1% of global foreign reserve assets.
Reserve-accumulating 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1) % of CC2) Regime
countries (with ranking) GDP (de jure)3)
1. Japan 172.4 207.3 207.9 203.2 277.7 347.2 387.7 451.4 652.8 824.3 823.1 17.7 N IF
2. China 73.6 105.0 139.9 145.0 154.7 165.6 212.2 286.4 403.2 609.9 769.0 37.0 Y MF
3. Taiwan 90.3 88.0 83.5 90.3 106.2 106.7 122.2 161.7 206.6 241.7 253.7 78.2 N IF
4. Korea – 29.4 8.9 48.5 74.1 96.2 102.8 121.4 155.3 199.1 205.9 29.1 N IF
6. Russia 14.4 11.3 12.9 7.8 8.4 24.3 32.5 44.0 73.2 120.6 155.7 20.7 Y MF
7. India – – 23.9 26.8 31.5 36.8 44.9 65.7 95.2 124.7 136.9 18.9 Y MF
8. Hong Kong 55.4 63.8 92.8 89.6 96.3 107.6 111.2 111.9 118.4 123.6 122.0 75.1 N CB
9. Singapore 68.8 77.0 71.4 75.0 77.2 80.4 75.8 82.3 96.3 112.8 115.5 104.4 N MF
10. Malaysia 22.9 25.1 20.0 24.7 29.7 28.6 29.6 33.3 43.5 58.2 75.8 55.5 Y MF
11. Mexico 15.7 16.7 26.7 29.5 30.7 36.2 40.0 45.8 55.7 61.0 68.6 15.0 N IF
12. Brazil 51.8 60.1 52.2 44.5 36.3 33.0 35.9 37.8 47.1 54.0 54.8 8.8 N IF
13. Algeria 2.0 4.2 8.0 6.8 4.4 11.9 18.0 23.1 32.9 39.4 51.7 52.9 Y MF
14. Thailand – – – 24.7 33.6 32.5 33.2 38.1 42.1 49.1 48.3 29.7 N MF
15. Norway 21.1 25.2 22.0 17.3 22.5 26.7 22.2 30.7 35.9 42.7 42.7 17.1 N IF
16. Turkey – – – – – 19.6 19.9 26.4 32.3 35.1 41.7 11.8 N IF
19. Denmark 10.2 13.4 18.2 13.7 21.1 14.5 16.1 25.9 36.0 38.2 34.4 15.8 N FP
20. Australia 11.3 13.9 16.1 13.4 19.5 16.8 16.4 18.6 29.9 33.9 33.4 6.1 N IF
Other (non-accumulating) reserve holders (with ranking)
5. Euro area 277.4 306.8 312.5 284.4 228 218.6 208 215.8 188 179 173.2
17. US 49.1 38.3 30.9 36.0 32.2 31.2 29.4 33.1 39.2 42.4 38.7
18. UK 39.2 37.1 28.8 27.3 30.1 39.3 32.0 32.8 35.1 39.5 38.6
Sources: IMF and CEIC Data Company database.
1) Latest available 2005 data (mostly to August 2005).
2) Capital controls: Y = Yes; N = No.
3) IF: Independent floating; MF: managed floating; FP: fixed peg; CB: currency board.
Table 2 Foreign exchange reserves of countries with the largest holdings: 1995-2005 1)
(net of gold, SDR and reserve positions at the IMF; end-of-period holdings; USD billions)
8 Including gold holdings valued at the historical price of SDR
35 per ounce, the share of EMEs in world reserves increased
from less than 20% to over 60% in the same period. With
gold valued at market prices, however, the share of reserves
held by mature economies would be significantly higher.12
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2 POSSIBLE DRIVERS OF THE RECENT
RESERVE ACCUMULATION
Traditional criteria, such as the adoption of
foreign exchange controls or de jure exchange
rate regimes and the adequacy of foreign
reserves, may not provide a full understanding
of the phenomenon of reserve accumulation
(see also Annex 2 for greater detail and a
review of the literature).
First, the presence or absence of controls on
capital movement is not a factor that
distinguishes reserve-accumulating economies
from other economies, as Table 2 confirms.
Second, sustained intervention has been taking
place even in economies with de jure
independent floating currency regimes, thus
confirming the de facto managed nature of such
regimes. This may have been partly because
expectations of further appreciation of the
exchange rate produced short-term capital
inflows, adding to exchange rate pressure in
the economy and thus inducing the local
authorities to intervene in order to prevent
excessive exchange rate appreciation and/or to
smooth out volatility. Third, the notion used
in the literature of “adequacy” or “excess” of
foreign reserves does not capture the key
features of the process of accumulation, at least
since 2002. Indeed, the main reserve-
accumulating economies have ratios of reserve
assets to imports that are well above the three to
four months’ coverage, which is the rule of
thumb. Taiwan, for instance, would be able to
finance its imports with its reserves for around
two years. Similarly, the ratios of reserves to
total external debt maturing within one year
have risen far above the level of 1
recommended by the Greenspan-Guidotti rule,
reaching a value of around 10 in China for
example. Turning to the ratio of reserves to
broad money, which indicates the potential for
a capital flight from the domestic currency by
residents, this indicator has also increased
significantly above the threshold values,
reaching levels of around 90% in India and
Singapore. Finally, an alternative indicator
that can be used is the ratio between a country’s
reserve assets and its IMF quota. If this ratio is
greater than unity, then the country concerned
has foreign assets exceeding the maximum IMF
resources it could borrow based on its IMF
quota. Again, for most reserve accumulators
this ratio far exceeds 100%.
All in all, these considerations support the view
that reserve accumulation in most countries
has gone beyond the levels warranted by
conventional indicators, suggesting that the
build-up is largely influenced by other factors.
Three of the fundamental drivers of reserve
accumulation, all of which are in some way
related to financial globalisation, stand out in
addition to the more recent oil price hike:
(i) A desire to self-insure against financial
crises (virtually all EMEs share this
motivation, although it is expected to lose
weight as accumulation progresses, and is
already less important than a few years
ago);
(ii) The pursuit, at least during certain periods
(e.g. following a financial crisis), of
export-led growth by a number of Asian
economies, supported by exchange rates
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and WEO.
1) To August 2005.
Chart 2 World foreign exchange reserves






















non-Asia Emerging Markets (right-hand scale)
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anchored de jure or de facto to the US
dollar;
(iii) The combined effect of a number of
features related to the financial structure
of several EMEs, including
underdeveloped domestic financial
systems and dollarisation of foreign assets
in certain net creditor Asian economies.
First, reserves may have been accumulated in
order to weather potential turbulence in
currency markets and/or shocks to the balance
of payments. The literature shows that this may
have been particularly the case for EMEs
characterised by a high degree of capital
mobility coupled with underdeveloped
domestic financial systems. This sensitisation
to financial risk is, in fact, mainly related to
developments such as the impressive
expansion in holdings of cross-border assets
and liabilities9 and the increased vulnerability
to sudden stops in capital flows in a context of
financial account liberalisation. While reserve
accumulation may no longer be proportional to
the actual risks faced by certain countries, this
does not seem to be the case as yet for most
Latin American emerging market debtor
economies. At least until recently, these
economies have long been unable to borrow
abroad in their domestic currencies – though in
countries like Mexico and Brazil there were
signs in 2005 that this situation was
significantly easing – and, therefore, have had
a particular incentive to accumulate reserves to
self-insure against a possible loss of access to
international capital markets. Even today in
Asia external risk mitigation considerations
still continue to be one of the reasons for
reserve accumulation. Unilateral reserve build-
up may also have been one way to pursue
greater independence from potential recourse
to IMF financing, to the extent that countries do
not regard conditional borrowing rights with
the IMF and their own assets as perfect
substitutes.10
Before focusing on the two other drivers of
reserve accumulation listed above, it should be
observed that, with a few temporary exceptions
(e.g. Brazil until 2002 and India until 2000 and
then again since 2004), the main emerging
market reserve accumulators have not behaved
as standard economic theory would predict, i.e.
maintained current accounts in deficit or close
to balance coupled with net foreign direct
investment (FDI) inflows and other financial
inflows from mature economies. EMEs have
been providing the rest of the world, and
especially the United States, with net resources
in the form of current account surpluses. This
implies that a significant excess of domestic
savings over investment has, as a rule, been a
characteristic shared by all major reserve
accumulators (including Japan), although this
has been the outcome of different trends in
savings and investment in the economies
concerned. Certain economies, moreover, have
not only recorded current account surpluses but
have also been confronted with increasing
exchange rate pressure arising from net
financial inflows. Accordingly, four different
groups of reserve accumulators can be
distinguished on the basis of the trends in their
balance of payments and savings-investment
balance. These groups are shown in Chart 3,
which focuses on the top nine emerging
market reserve accumulators and confirms that,
though as a result of different developments, all
these economies have on average recorded
excess domestic savings over investment,
i.e. current account surpluses. This, however,
does not imply reserve accumulation per se.
The phenomenon can therefore only be
understood in conjunction with other features
typifying the countries under examination.
9 According to the IMF, worldwide gross external assets have
increased from USD 2.4 trillion in 1980 to around USD 40
trillion today.
10 Reserve accumulation is also likely to have indirectly
smoothed the progress of regional monetary and financial
cooperation in East Asia. The total size of bilateral swap
arrangements available in East Asia under the Chiang Mai
Initiative, amounting to around USD 39.5 billion in March
2005, could soon rise by up to 100% following a decision
taken by ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers at their meeting in
Istanbul on 4 May 2005. On this occasion it was also
announced that the financing threshold above which IMF
conditionality would not apply will be increased from 10% to
20%.14
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One of these features may, in a number of
countries and for limited periods, have been the
pursuit of some form of export-led growth,
which is the second possible driver of reserve
accumulation identified in this paper. In
particular, in Asian countries other than China
and India, the investment/GDP ratio has
dropped significantly since the mid-1990s, as
a result of: (i) the 1997-98 financial crises
(see Charts 3a and 3c) and (ii) the bubble years
in Japan. Most notably, in the ASEAN-5
countries and Korea the average investment/
GDP ratio, which was 34.7% in 1996, was
still 24.1% in 2004. With the savings ratio
remaining broadly unchanged, this seems to
have induced several of these countries to use
the US dollar as a monetary anchor to underpin
export-led growth after 1997. It should be
Chart 3 Reserve accumulation, balance of payments composition and savings-investment
balance in the nine main emerging market reserve accumulators
(USD billions; data aggregated for country clusters as described in the text)
Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Reserve accumulation does not fully equal the algebraic sum of the other balance of payments items shown in the charts. The
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observed, however, that in more recent years
the contribution of net exports to real GDP
growth has been declining in most Asian
economies, with the notable exceptions of
Singapore, Hong Kong S.A.R. and, since 2003,
Korea. Moreover, the recent experience of
Korea – which saw its currency appreciate by
around 24% against the US dollar between the
initial months of 2002 and the final months
of 200511 while reserves doubled in the same
period to USD 206 billion – suggests that other
factors have been at play.
Another factor that may have produced
resistance to exchange rate appreciation and,
hence, supported reserve accumulation in these
countries, is their high degree of trade openness
(90% on average in Asia). This implies a higher
pass-through of exchange rate changes into
domestic prices, and hence a stronger
deflationary bias in the event of currency
appreciation.
Unlike other Asian EMEs, China saw its
investment/GDP ratio rise between 1996 and
200412, which has not prevented the country
from recording current account surpluses in the
presence of a saving rate increasing even more
(see Chart 3d). In this context, the Chinese
authorities have maintained an exchange rate
policy that has resulted in currency
depreciation in real effective terms since 2002.
Between that year and the exchange rate reform
of 21 July 2005, the real effective exchange rate
(REER) of the renminbi fell by around 15%,
though still remaining above the 1995 level.
This trend – which the recent exchange rate
reform has only partly reversed – has
supported, together with very low labour costs,
the price competitiveness of Chinese exports,
thus helping to fuel growth in a dual economy
characterised by a rural population of
underemployed workers accounting for two-
thirds of the population but less than 30% of
GDP.
Besides the developments described above, net
excess savings have to be also examined in
connection with certain features of EMEs’
financial structures, which leads to the
discussion of the third driver of reserve
accumulation. Given the inability of their
financial markets to channel private savings to
investment, either domestically or abroad, in
certain countries the public sector may have
endeavoured to direct residual savings abroad,
thus leading to reserve accumulation. This
seems to apply to China, given its outward
foreign exchange controls and the role of the
public sector in the economy. Indirect
confirmation of this interpretation may
possibly be provided by the case of Japan,
where the suspension of intervention
operations since mid-March 2004 seems to
have been associated with – and made possible
by – a considerable increase in the share of
foreign assets held by the private sector.
A related aspect is that several reserve-
accumulating countries are becoming
international net creditors. In some of these
countries, however, external assets remain
largely or fully denominated in foreign
currency, either because they lend only limited
amounts in domestic currency (e.g. Japan) or
because lending in their domestic currencies is
precluded by asymmetric foreign exchange
controls (e.g. China). This leads to
fundamental mismatches in their national
balance sheets, consisting of sizeable holdings
of liquid assets mainly denominated in US
dollars that are not balanced on the liability
side. Especially in Asia, asset dollarisation has
led to attempts to “socialise” the exchange rate
risk, i.e. to use reserve assets as a vehicle to
transfer this risk from the private to the official
sector, though not reducing it for the economy
11 In nominal effective terms, after remaining relatively stable
in 2002-03, the Korean won appreciated by more than 20%
between May 2004 and end-2005.
12 The trend in investment recorded in China, which runs
counter to those of most other countries in the region, may be
partly due to China’s growing role as a hub in the Asian
production and export chain. Given this role, it is difficult
for China’s regional partners to let the exchange rate
significantly appreciate in the absence of measures to
revalue or introduce greater flexibility in China’s exchange
rates. The immediate reaction of Malaysia to the 2%
revaluation of the renminbi in July 2005 clearly confirms
this point.16
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as a whole13. In certain countries this may
have been partly justified by the fact that
private hedging is more difficult and costly,
particularly in periods characterised by
one-way bets on the exchange rate, which
constrains private capital outflows even in the
absence of restrictions on them.
On the whole, these recent drivers of reserve
accumulation seem to have one aspect in
common, namely the role played by the build-
up of official foreign assets both as an outcome
of and an instrument for integration of the
EMEs concerned into the global financial
markets. Several emerging countries,
especially in Asia, have in fact become major
players in international trade but are still
underdeveloped from a financial angle.
3 DOMESTIC RISKS AND COSTS OF RESERVE
ACCUMULATION
While past experience indicates that central
banks were usually able to sterilise the
expansionary impact of foreign exchange
purchases on base money, interventions have
been larger and more prolonged in recent years.
When specific features of today’s reserve-
accumulating EMEs, such as their
underdeveloped financial systems, are taken
into account, some risks and costs may
materialise as a result of the process of
accumulation. The most significant ones are
summarised in Table 3 and include inflationary
pressure, overinvestment, asset bubbles,
complications in the management of monetary
policy, segmentation of the public debt market,
potentially sizeable capital losses on monetary
13 Unlike in Asia, there has been little socialisation of the
exchange rate risk in Latin America. One exception was
Brazil in 1997-99, when the currency mismatches of the
corporate and banking sector were transferred to the public
sector through a number of measures, including the issuance
to residents of Treasury securities linked to the US dollar. As
a result, the overall exposure of the economy to exchange
rate fluctuations did not change significantly. There is,
however, strong evidence that since 1999 the Brazilian
private sector has been hedging against exchange rate risk on
its own, thus no longer relying on the official sector’s safety
net.
Table 3 Potential risks and costs of reserve accumulation 1)
Source: Eurosystem.
1) In Annex 3 some background information is provided on how these risks and costs might have become relevant, to varying
degrees, in the recent past across a sample of large reserve holders.
Potential risk or cost
Risks (1) Conflict between exchange rate stability and
inappropriate easing of monetary conditions,
eventually resulting in inflation and/or
overinvestment and/or bubbles
(2) Difficulties for central banks in managing the
money market and, more generally, in implementing
monetary policy
(3) Segmentation of the public debt market, thus
impairing its liquidity
(4) Market (i.e., currency and interest rate) risk,
resulting in potentially sizeable capital losses on the
balance sheet of the monetary authority
Costs (1) Sterilisation costs
(2) Concerns about bank profitability
Underlying factors
Unsuccessful sterilisation due to e.g. (i) underdeveloped
financial markets and shortage of sterilisation instruments;
(ii) snowball effects (i.e. higher interest rates produced by
sterilisation coupled with expectations of exchange rate
appreciation produce massive capital inflows, thus forcing the
central bank to intervene/sterilise even more)
Excessive central bank dependence on liquidity-absorbing
transactions, whereas the money market is more easily
managed via liquidity-providing operations
Excessive sterilisation through issuance of central bank
liabilities instead of government paper
Accumulation over time of a potential for currency
revaluation/appreciation, which materialises when
intervention ceases or is no longer effective; interest rate risk
The yields paid on domestic sterilisation instruments exceed
those on foreign assets
Particularly because of controls on lending, the banking sector
might have hardly any alternatives to buying low-yield
sterilisation instruments17
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authorities’ balance sheets, sterilisation costs,
and misallocation of domestic banks’ lending
(see Annex 3 for greater detail). At the same
time, the risks and costs may vary significantly
from country to country and, over time, within
each country. Hence, the balance of incentives
and disincentives to accumulate reserves may
also change. Looking forward, if net
disincentives were to materialise in a number
of countries, accumulation would probably
decrease overall but it might also become
further concentrated in a smaller group of
economies.
In China, the intervention-related rise in
reserve money was almost entirely sterilised in
2002, but the sterilisation rate proved to be
much more limited in 2003-04, partly because
of implementation difficulties. Partly as a
result, the annual consumer price index (CPI)
rate increased from -0.8% in 2002 to 3.9% in
2004, alongside signs of overinvestment and
local property price bubbles. Yet inflation
remains subdued in China if one considers its
impressive growth rate, and even trended down
significantly after October 2004. Financial
“repression” in the form of both administrative
measures to limit credit expansion and
asymmetric controls on capital flows played an
important role in achieving this. Even though
such measures entail a cost in terms of
misallocation of resources and have not
prevented the country from recording massive
“speculative” inflows and some interest rate
tightening, they nevertheless allow China to
benefit from exchange rate stability and some
degree of monetary policy autonomy at the
same time. Moreover, sterilisation costs have
been kept under control, even when US interest
rates reached their low point, and have become
easier to manage since the current US
tightening cycle started in mid-2004.
In Korea, where the intervention-related
growth in reserve money was largely sterilised
in 2003-04, the main problem faced by the
central bank is in its own view, the over-
reliance of its monetary policy on liquidity-
absorbing transactions. Moreover, in 2004
the interest payments on the Monetary
Stabilisation Bonds issued by the Bank of
Korea to control the money supply were
significantly higher than prevailing US interest
rates. This negative differential contributed to
the loss of KRW 150 billion (about USD 130
million) posted in the Bank of Korea’s 2004
balance sheet. The sizeable intervention, which
in just a few years has made this country the
fourth largest reserve holder in the world
(starting from a level of USD 9 billion as
recently as end-1997), has not prevented the
won from appreciating strongly against the US
dollar since 2002. Such an appreciation might
occasionally have led to some tension between
the objective of maintaining a fairly stable
effective exchange rate in a regional context
and the strategy of inflation targeting pursued
by the central bank since 1998.
In India, the large capital inflows recorded in
recent years have presented a challenge for
the conduct of monetary policy and triggered
a debate on the need for exchange rate
adjustment. At the beginning of 2004, the
Ministry of Finance agreed with the Reserve
Bank of India to issue government securities
and bills exclusively for sterilisation purposes.
In comparison with issuance of the central
bank’s own liabilities, this measure proved
successful in permitting sterilisation
operations that do not contribute to segmenting
the sovereign bond market. However, India has
experienced a very unfavourable differential
between foreign and domestic interest rates,
entailing sterilisation costs.
In Russia, central bank interventions have been
accompanied by strong liquidity growth and
increased inflationary pressure. While tight
fiscal policy and the setting-up of the oil
stabilisation fund in 2004 (which has proved to
be a substitute for sterilisation) have greatly
helped the Bank of Russia to keep monetary
conditions reasonably balanced, the current
monetary and fiscal policy frameworks and
instruments may need to be further adjusted if
progress is to be achieved in keeping inflation
under control in the period ahead. Thus, the18
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debate on moving to inflation targeting and a
more flexible exchange rate policy14 is likely to
continue in Russia.
Besides these general risks and costs, reserve
accumulation has also had some implications
for the balance sheets of certain central banks.
These implications are described in Annex 4
with regard to seven Asian central banks. In
particular, it should be noted that the foreign
assets of most of these institutions are currently
much greater than their capital base.
4 MAIN TRENDS IN CENTRAL BANK RESERVE
MANAGEMENT
Not only have world reserves increased
dramatically in recent years, but the way they
are managed has also evolved over time. The
frameworks for foreign reserve management,
however, vary significantly across countries,
with China and Japan – the two largest reserve
holders – being examples of management styles
that differ from trends prevailing elsewhere.
While recent trends in reserve management are
analysed more thoroughly in Annex 5, their
main features are summarised below.
Reserve management in Japan is still strictly
considered from a policy viewpoint, and in fact
it is conducted along “passive” guidelines by
the Ministry of Finance, i.e. with limited
sensitivity to the risk/return trade-off. Little
information is available on reserve
management in China. Regarding the other
Asian economies, the most important
development in reserve management has
been the use of a broader range of instruments.
In addition, so-called heritage funds and
investment corporations have been set up, for
example by Singapore and Korea respectively,
with more explicit longer-term return-oriented
objectives.
Investment in new instruments has become an
important feature of reserve management in
several Asian countries. The investment
spectrum, which was mostly limited to time
deposits and government bonds until a few
years ago, now includes: (i) other interest rate
products, such as interest rate derivatives and
debt instruments bearing a spread over US
Treasuries (e.g. BIS instruments, corporate
bonds and government-linked issues such as
those of the US agencies); and (ii) sometimes
even equities. One approach adopted in order to
foster diversification along the yield curve and
across asset classes, is to split foreign reserves
into a liquidity portfolio and an investment
portfolio. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
for example, has kept all foreign reserves under
one roof at the central bank but has separated
the funds into distinct portfolios with different
objectives, risk profiles, time horizons and
eligible instruments. In Korea, foreign reserve
assets to an initial value of USD 20 billion (out
of a total of USD 205 billion) started to be
managed by an independent entity, the Korean
Investment Corporation (KIC), on 1 July 2005,
with the aim of seeking higher yields. The
funds were shifted from the Bank of Korea’s
reserves (which contributed USD 17 billion)
and the Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund of
the Ministry of Finance (which provided USD 3
billion). The Bank of Korea will, however,
maintain the option to recall its assets in the
event of an emergency, i.e. the funds are
retained as international reserves while being
entrusted to the KIC for management. The KIC
partly resembles the model of the Government
of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC),
which was established in the 1990s in response
to the rapid growth of Singapore’s foreign
reserve holdings. The GIC currently has around
USD 100 billion under management for non-
intervention-related purposes, which is clearly
disentangled from the country’s reserves. The
main objectives of these moves are to achieve
higher long-term returns and to preserve the
assets’ value for future generations (hence the
funds are sometimes referred to as “future
generation” or “heritage” funds). The pool of
eligible instruments used to invest these funds
often differs quite substantially from the one
14 It should be borne in mind that in Russia, unlike in most of
the other economies reviewed in this paper, the euro plays an
increasingly important role in exchange rate policy and the
process of reserve accumulation.19
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used by traditional reserve managers, and
includes, for example, equities, corporate
bonds and special forms of investment. Such
institutions, moreover, often also have other
objectives, such as fostering the domestic asset
management industry (Korea) and the domestic
capital market (Singapore and Hong Kong
S.A.R.).
Despite these developments, however, this
diversification into new instrument types,
although impressive for its rapidity, has not yet
altered the picture significantly since, given
safety and liquidity constraints, the bulk of
reserve assets is still government or quasi-
government bonds, and the percentage of
foreign reserves not invested in interest rate
products is still negligible. Hence, while the
changes in foreign reserve management have
been significant, they do not appear to have
kept pace with reserve accumulation.
Turning to currency diversification, IMF data
expressed in US dollars point to broad stability
in the shares of reserve currencies in global
foreign exchange assets in recent years, with
the US dollar still accounting for the bulk
(66.4% as at the end of September 2005)
and the euro increasing its weight from 18%
in 1999 to 24.3% in 2004, partly owing to
positive valuation effects recorded in the
period 2002-0415 (see Table 4).
The US dollar is still by far the most dominant
reserve currency, especially in Asia. There are
in fact several, mutually reinforcing reasons
related to asset management which seem to
play a significant role in the US dollar’s
predominance:
– the breadth, depth and liquidity of US fixed
income markets (and US financial markets
in general) compared with those of the euro
area and Japan (see Table 5);
– the fact that all the largest reserve
accumulators can be expected, at least for
the time being, to continue to use the US
dollar as a vehicle for intervention, either
primarily or exclusively;
– the increasing use of derivatives by central
bank portfolio managers, which allows for
more flexibility than in the past (e.g. by
investing in one currency while shouldering
the interest rate risk in a different market, for
instance by using foreign exchange swaps).
The trends in instrument and currency
diversification described above are confirmed
by the evidence on investment of foreign
reserves in US assets, for which more data
is available. While comprehensive stock
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1)
All countries 2)
US dollar 71.0 70.5 70.7 66.5 65.8 66.0 66.4
Euro 17.9 18.8 19.8 24.2 25.3 24.9 24.3
Japanese yen 6.4 6.3 5.2 4.5 4.1 3.8 3.7
Pound sterling 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.6 3.2 3.6
Swiss franc 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1
Other currencies 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.9
Table 4 Official foreign exchange reserves: currency shares
(as a percentage of total identified holdings; end-of-year values expressed in US dollars)
Source: IMF.
1) End-of-September data.
2) Shares are calculated only for the group of countries reporting reserve currency composition to the IMF, which account for around
70% of world reserve holdings.
15 These shares, however, are calculated only for the group of
countries reporting reserve currency composition to the IMF,
which account for around 70% of world reserve holdings.
This group does not include some of the major reserve
accumulators.20
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statistics covering all types of instrument are
not available, data are made public on holdings
of marketable US Treasury bonds, notes and
bills held by foreign official institutions, which
amounted to almost USD 1,230 billion (nearly
60% of total foreign holdings of US Treasury
securities, or 32.5% of the total amount
outstanding) at end-September 2005.
Turning to flow data, it is interesting to look at
the available evidence for 2004 and draw some
initial inferences from the, as yet incomplete,
2005 statistics. In 2004 foreign official
institutions are estimated to have purchased US
government-linked assets (including federal
agency bonds) amounting to over USD 254
billion, whereas investment in corporate bonds
and equities amounted to only USD 13 billion.
Reserve accumulation resulted in significantly
larger US dollar positions of foreign central
banks in the United States in the same year.
Four types of investment can be distinguished
according to aggregate data disclosed by the
US Treasury, anecdotal information and data
disclosed by individual central banks, such as
the Bank of Japan:
– First, in 2004 a large part of foreign
exchange reserves was invested in US
Treasury securities, including T-bills.
Foreign official institutions are estimated to
have purchased US Treasury notes and
bonds with a net face value of USD 201
billion16, amounting to 70% of the total net
issuance of US Treasury notes and bonds
during this period. Total US Treasury
securities purchases – including bills –
amounted to around USD 234 billion,
representing almost two-thirds of the net
issuance of these securities.
– Second, foreign official investors also
purchased federal agency bonds bearing
high yields. According to the Treasury, the
stock of these bonds held by foreigners
increased by USD 20 billion in 200417.
Table 5 Nominal value of outstanding bonds at the end of 2003
(USD billions)
Source: Merrill Lynch (Size & Structure of the World Bond Market: 2004).
1) Includes mortgage securities and municipals in the US and municipals, government guaranteed and private placement in Japan.
2) In the euro area, covered bonds are included in the corporate category. Exchange rate = JPY 107.116/USD; EUR 0.7936/USD.
Total government (sovereign and quasi-sovereign) issues
government agencies other 1)
Total % World % of % of % of % of
Year 2003 outstanding bond mkt Total total Total total Total total Total total
US 21,351 47.6 10,405 48.7 2,646 12.4 2,608 12.2 5,151 24.1
Japan 7,164 16.0 5,838 81.5 4,631 64.7 - - 1,206 16.8
Euro area 2) 10,306 23.0 4,639 44.8 4,639 44.8 - - -
Total corporate Total foreign Total eurobond
% of % of % of
Year 2003 Total total Total total Total total
US 6,456 30 385 2 4,106 19
Japan 837 12 57 1 432 6
Euro area 2) 3,998 43.3 1,669 11.9
16 Estimate based on the US Treasury’s international capital
report (TIC).
17 According to Federal Reserve System data, the proportion of
US federal agency bonds held in custody for foreign official
institutions by the US Federal Reserve System shows an
upward trend over the last few years, reaching around 20% of
total foreign official institutions’ custody holdings in 2004
compared with around 12% in 2000. These data, however, are
not consistent with those of the US Treasury as there is a
significant discrepancy between TIC system (Treasury) and
Statistical Release H.4.1 (Federal Reserve) data in this
respect. According to the latter, the 2004 increase in federal
agency securities held by foreign official investors was much
larger (i.e. USD 60 billion).21
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– Third, a significant part of reserves was also
held in time deposits – especially in the
periods immediately following large foreign
currency purchases in the context of
intervention activity. Information on this
third component is available only for Japan,
which, at the end of 2004, held 15% of its
total foreign exchange reserves in time
deposits.
– Fourth, only a minor part of reserves was
invested in corporate bonds and equities. In
2004, these purchases amounted to USD 13
billion, and were mainly purchases of US
corporate bonds. It is, however, likely that
the relative importance of these instruments
will grow over time. For instance, the Bank
of Korea highlighted this trend in a report
submitted to the Korean National
Assembly’s Finance and Economy
Committee on 24 February 2005.
Chart 4, which is based on US Treasury data,
compares the total amount of US government
and agencies’ longer-term securities with the
amount of T-bills, corporate bonds and equities
purchased by foreign official institutions. The
US Treasury, however, does not report data on
official investment in US time deposits.
Preliminary data for 2005 point, on the whole,
to a significant decrease in the share of foreign
official institutions in the financing of the US
current account deficit by comparison with
2004 (down to less than one-third from around
two-thirds, on a net basis). Some substitution
of private for public investors is therefore
likely to have occurred. A further explanation
may, however, be that during 2005 oil
exporters have been replacing the Asian
countries as the group of countries with the
largest current account surplus. Their ensuing
accumulation of foreign assets is, however,
unlikely to have taken the form of traditional
reserve accumulation for the most part, but
would rather have been a build-up of assets
abroad by state-owned oil funds. As Chart 5
illustrates, this may have been reflected in a
dramatic increase in the net portfolio outflows
of oil-exporting countries18, which is not
recorded as reserve accumulation but nor is it
private investment. The importance of this
development argues greater transparency in
statistics on portfolio investment by oil funds.
Moreover, apart from the aggregate
information discussed above, the exact
amounts of individual central banks’ reserve
holdings denominated in US dollars and
invested in the United States is not known due
to the US Treasury’s duty of confidentiality in
its reporting, which is largely derived from
custodians-based information.
Regarding investment in euro-denominated
instruments, the data available are much less
comprehensive than those from the United
States, which limits the scope of the analysis.
The Eurosystem is in fact only able to track
between 15% and 30% of foreign reserve
investment in euro-denominated assets. While
it can be inferred that official holdings of
foreign reserve assets denominated in euro,
which amount to approximately USD 740
billion, are, to a large extent, held in German
Chart 4 Net purchases of US Treasury securities,
federal agency bonds, corporate bonds and
equities by foreign official institutions
(2000-2004;USD billions)
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18 In Chart 5 the oil exporters include Saudi Arabia, Russia,
Norway, Iran, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela,
Nigeria, Kuwait, Mexico, Libya and Qatar (selected and
ranked on the basis of the size of their 2005 oil balance
surpluses expressed in US dollars).22
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and French long-term securities, no
conclusions can be drawn as regards the
geographical distribution of the central banks
and other institutions holding euro-
denominated foreign reserve assets.
5 ALTERNATIVE USES OF ACCUMULATED
FOREIGN ASSETS
An important development in recent years has
been the increasing use of part of the foreign
assets accumulated by the public sector for
alternative purposes, such as the
aforementioned creation of oil funds in several
countries, the recapitalisation of state-owned
banks in China, the repayment of external debt
in Russia, and the funding of investment in
Taiwan. The IMF does not, of course, count
such “innovative” uses of foreign assets as
reserves since they are not related to foreign
exchange policy targets19.
The main rationale for setting up oil funds in
recent years is that oil prices are highly volatile
and unpredictable. Hence, revenues often
differ greatly from budget projections,
requiring either fiscal adjustment or public
financing for any shortfalls. As a result, not
only have several oil-exporting countries
established such funds (e.g. Russia, Norway,
Venezuela, Kuwait and Oman), but other oil
exporters are also considering doing so. Oil
funds can be classified into two categories:
while the majority are designed to address the
aforementioned problems created by the
volatility and unpredictability of oil revenues
(stabilisation funds), some are also used to save
part of the oil revenues for future generations
(savings funds). Some funds have both
objectives. In the case of stabilisation funds,
when oil prices are high a portion of the
revenue is channelled from the government
budget to the stabilisation fund; when oil
revenues are low, the fund makes up the
shortfall. There is some debate about the
effectiveness of these funds in stabilising
government spending. Empirical research from
the IMF on past experience with oil
stabilisation funds suggests that, except in
Norway, oil funds did not significantly affect
the relationship between oil export earnings
and government expenditure. The policy
implication is that an oil stabilisation fund can
be no substitute for sound, medium-term-
oriented fiscal policies20.
In early January 2004 China’s central bank
announced that it had injected USD 45 billion
from the country’s foreign exchange reserves
into the Bank of China and the Construction
Bank of China to increase their capital base. In
2005, a similar injection, though for the lower
amount of USD 15 billion, was carried out for
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.
In the former case, the two state-owned banks –
which are considered to be the flagships of the
bank reform process – had already started to
raise their capital adequacy ratios through
various subordinate bond issues in 2003. It is
important to note that the transfer of foreign
exchange assets was not converted into
Chart 5 Oil exporters’ net financial outflows
(USD billions; positive sign means net outflows)





















19 The same applies to the heritage funds discussed in
Section 4.
20 However, it should be noted that in Russia foreign assets
amounting to USD 15 billion held in an oil stabilisation fund
have been used to repay Soviet-era debt ahead of schedule.
The agreement between Russia and the Paris Club was
reached in May 2005 and marks the biggest ever buy-back of
Paris Club debt by any debtor country.23
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domestic currency and, therefore, exerted no
pressure on the value of the renminbi. The
government also retained control over the
management of these transferred assets
through a newly created investment company
run jointly by the central bank, the ministry of
finance and the State Administration for
Foreign Exchange. Even so, the move was
unprecedented, as in the past the government’s
strategy for restructuring state-owned
commercial banks had relied on increasing its
liabilities rather than transferring its assets.
Since high non-performing loan ratios were
hindering the banks’ efforts to raise their
capital adequacy ratios, this capital injection
made it easier for them to reach the 8% capital
ratio target. However, it exposed the banks’
capital base to currency risks, since the capital
injection was denominated in US dollars.
Finally, in Taiwan USD 15 billion has been
allocated to banks for use in major investment
projects to foster domestic growth.
The effects of these innovative ways of using
foreign assets are still to be fully appreciated,
as, depending on the origin of the foreign assets
and the objectives pursued, they create
unprecedented bridge from monetary and
exchange rate policy to fiscal policy, from the
macroeconomic to the micro-prudential
dimensions of economic policy, and from
central bank management of foreign exchange
market risks to management of portfolio
instruments outside the realm of foreign
reserve assets by other entities. At the same
time, converting short-term monetary or
financial assets into long-term wealth holdings
– possibly including non-financial assets – may
provide certain countries with a meaningful
vehicle for diversifying their risk exposure to
US dollar assets in a gradual and orderly way.
6  IMPACT ON YIELDS AND ASSET PRICES
A majority of market participants, academics
and policy-makers believe that reserve
accumulation may have contributed to
abnormally low yields in mature economies.
From a qualitative viewpoint, given the sheer
size of foreign reserves transactions, their
concentration in the US Treasury market and
their relative price insensitivity, there are
reasons to believe that reserve accumulation
has contributed to lowering US long-term
interest rates. However, the supporting
empirical evidence is not clear-cut. Estimates
range, as shown in Table 6, from 30 basis points
(Merrill Lynch and JP Morgan) to 200 basis
points (N. Roubini), though admittedly
estimates in the high part of the range lack
empirical support and are mainly based on the
judgement of experts. One well-known
contribution is that of Bernanke, Reinhart and
Sack of the US Federal Reserve System, who
find evidence that Japan’s interventions
between 2000 and the first quarter of 2004 had a
significant impact on the yields of Treasury
notes and bonds21, while there is no such
evidence for Treasury bills.
Despite the abundant literature, the lack of high
quality data on foreign official institutions’ net
purchases makes the empirical evidence
supporting the link between interventions and
US yields not particularly robust. In this
context, views denying any effect have also
been put forward. According to an analysis by
the Vanguard Group, cessation of Chinese net
purchases of US government bonds would have
virtually no effect on any of the US Treasury’s
yields. B. McCauley (2004) identifies only an
unstable relationship between foreign official
institutions’ net purchases of US government
bonds and Treasury yields, existing for very
limited periods (i.e. a few weeks).
Furthermore, the US Federal Reserve System’s
weekly release on foreign official institutions’
custody holdings is found to have no effect on
Treasury market rates.
A study presented in Annex 6 provides an
econometric quantification of the impact of
purchases of US Treasury securities by foreign
21 See Bernanke, B., Reinhart V . and Sack, B. (2004):
“Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An
Empirical Assessment”, Finance and Economics Discussion
Series, Federal Reserve Board.24
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official institutions. It finds that purchases of
US Treasuries by Asian monetary authorities
(particularly Japan) had an impact on the level
and dynamics of their yields, but this is
empirically supported only for short to
medium-term maturities. In particular,
Japanese purchases of US Treasuries, at the
time of most sizeable interventions, might have
had an impact of 65 basis points on three-year
US Treasury yields. Regarding developments
in the long end of the yield curve, the study
identifies a downward structural change in the
determination of interest rates since the turn of
the millennium, but on the other hand does not
find clear-cut evidence that purchases of US
Treasuries by Asian monetary authorities was
one of the main factors in the decreased yield.
More specifically, the approach followed in the
contribution presented in Annex 6 is based on
an estimation of the long and short-term
relationship between Treasury yields,
monetary stance, inflation expectations, fiscal
deficits and foreign official purchases of
Treasuries. The estimates are, as mentioned,
supportive of the notion that purchases by
Asian monetary authorities – especially
Japanese intervention – have had an impact on
the short to medium end of the Treasury yield
curve since 1999, in terms of both levels and
changes in levels. Regarding long-term
government bond22 yields, the paper argues that
there seems to be a downward bias in current
interest rates, which is in line with the idea of
the “long-term interest rate conundrum”.
According to the empirical evidence provided
in the study, however, the interventions
conducted by Asian central banks cannot be
shown to be responsible for the low yield level
reached, although they have certainly played a
22 Little evidence could be found regarding the impact of
purchases by Asian central banks on the price level and
market dynamics of corporate bonds, agency bonds and
equities with different maturities. This is not surprising
since, as discussed in Section 4, the amounts that central
banks invest in these market segments are a tiny proportion
of both their overall investment and the markets concerned.
Source Approach Estimated reduction
Merrill Lynch - 30
JP Morgan - 30-50
Goldman Sachs - 40
Edwin Truman General estimate based on assumed equivalence of reserve accumulation and 75
reduction of fiscal deficit
Patrick Artus Regression of yield changes on fiscal deficit, current account and foreign 75
net Treasury purchases
Ben Bernanke et al. Regression of yield changes on intervention estimates, interpretation of yield 50-100
disequilibria as a response to demand shocks
Bill Gross - 100
Banque de France Error correction model: estimating the long and short-term relationship between 125
Treasury yields, fiscal deficit and measures of foreign official and foreign private
net Treasury purchases
Stephen Roach - 100-150
Nouriel Roubini et al. General estimate based on correction of conventional estimates taking into 200
account possible downward biases stemming from methodological limitations
to statistical analysis
McCauley (BIS) Regression of yield changes on changes in foreign central banks’ custody Significant,
holdings of Treasuries with the US Federal Reserve System but unstable and
short-lived relation
Vanguard Group VAR regression: dynamic relationship between different Treasury maturities, no long-term effect
outstanding government debt, and foreign net Treasury purchases
Table 6 Estimates of the effect of reserve accumulation on US Treasury yields
(basis points)
Source: Eurosystem.
Note: Dash (-) indicates that the method used for the estimate has not been published.25
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role in explaining shorter-term dynamics. Over
a longer-term horizon, the paper identifies, in
line with the literature, a fundamental change
in the behaviour of US bond yields since the
turn of the millennium. In this regard, it should
be born in mind that in recent years the large
central bank purchases of US Treasuries
occurred at the same time as demand from
pension funds and life insurance companies
was increasing.26
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ANNEX 1
STYLISED FACTS OF THE ACCUMULATION OF
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES1
1 INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
On a global scale, foreign exchange reserves
have risen sharply during the last decade, with
the build-up accelerating until 2004 and most
of the increase occurring in emerging market
economies. Foreign exchange reserves rose
from USD 1.2 trillion in January 1995 to USD
4.0 trillion in September 2005.2 The share of
such reserves held by Asian countries relative
to the world total increased from 45% in
January 1995 to 67% in August 2005.
Conversely, the share of the Latin American
countries as a group decreased from 8% in
January 1995 to 5% in August 2005.
Looking at the amounts outstanding, eight
Asian economies are among the ten largest
reserve holders: Japan, the People’s Republic
of China, the Taiwan Province of China, Korea,
India, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and
Malaysia (Chart 6).
ANNEXES
Singapore has the highest percentage of
reserves to GDP (104.4%), followed by Taiwan
(78.2%), Hong Kong (75.1%) and Malaysia
(55.5%). Japan is the world’s largest reserve
holder and also the only industrial economy
within the top ten reserve-holding economies
to have actively increased its reserve holdings
until recently (March 2004). The Japanese
authorities purchased a total of USD 177
billion in 2003 and USD 138 billion in the first
quarter of 2004. The People’s Republic of
China has also been, and still is, increasing its
reserves considerably. In December 2005
reserves stood at USD 818 billion (equivalent
to 36% of Chinese GDP). Specifically, since
2003 China’s reserve accumulation has also
been associated with non-foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the form of private capital
inflows as international investors have been
expecting a revaluation of the Chinese
currency. In 2004 FDI inflows and the trade
surplus together accounted for only 55% of the
increase in reserves (compared with 78% in
2003 and 125% in 2002), but this share rose
again in 2005 (75%).
Oil-exporting countries in Africa and the
Middle East also increased their stocks of
reserves in keeping with the oil price rise. In
Africa reserves increased from USD 39 billion
at the end of January 1995 to USD 147 billion at
the end of June 2005. The largest reserve holder
in Africa is Algeria, while other important
reserve holders include Libya, Nigeria,
Morocco, Egypt and South Africa. During the
same period, foreign exchange reserves in the
Middle East rose from USD 33 billion to USD
92 billion3. However, it is likely that the
amount of foreign exchange reserve holdings in
OPEC member countries is underestimated, as
several oil-exporting countries channel part of














































1 Prepared by F. Comelli (European Central Bank), with inputs
from J. Routava (Suomen Pankki – Finlands Bank).
2 As reported by the IMF in its latest update of the database
on Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange
Reserves.
3 The Middle East region includes the following countries:
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates,
Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan and Lebanon. Foreign
exchange reserves holdings for Iran and Iraq are not
available.27
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ANNEX 1
their oil revenues into oil funds (see next
section) without reporting these funds to the
IMF. In addition, according to the Bank for
International Settlements (2005a) the increase
in total financial outflows from OPEC member
countries, which was triggered by rising oil
revenues, is not fully reflected in available
counterparty data.4 There are several possible
explanations for the current large gap between
rising outflows from OPEC member countries
and counterparty data. First, the available
counterparty data do not capture offshore
purchases of securities. For example, the
estimate of OPEC’s cumulative net purchases
of US securities based on the data from the US
Treasury International Capital (TIC) system
would tend to underestimate the total by an
amount equivalent to purchases of these
securities in London or other financial centres
outside the United States. Second, cross-border
investment in regional stock and bond markets
is likely to have become a more important
outlet for petrodollars than before. Many
countries in the Middle East are, experiencing
an economic boom; the stock market indices in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates more than quadrupled between the
end of 2001 and the end of June 2005. Finally,
there is some evidence that petrodollars are
being invested more broadly – more diversified
geographically and across the asset spectrum –
than they once were. For instance, hedge funds
and private equity funds, which have
experienced large inflows worldwide in recent
years but which are not required to release
information on the positions of their investor
base, are one possible home for these
investments.
In Russia, the devaluation of the rouble in 1998
and rising commodity prices led to current
account surpluses, reaching 10% of GDP in
2004. Previously, significant outflows
hindered the growth of reserves, but in 2003-
2004 rising oil revenues and more balanced
capital flows led to a considerable
accumulation of reserve assets. In Latin
America, finally, reserves rose from USD 95
billion (January 1995) to USD 239 billion
(August 2005). Mexico and Brazil are the two
largest reserve holders in the region.
2 RESERVES CHANNELLED INTO OIL AND
HERITAGE FUNDS
In some countries, part of the foreign currency-
denominated oil revenues is invested directly
in foreign assets without the need for
intervention and sterilisation by central banks.
Specifically, some oil-exporting countries
have established oil funds in order to smooth
fiscal revenues. Since oil prices and revenues
are highly volatile and unpredictable, actual
fiscal revenues in oil exporting countries often
differ greatly from budget projections,
meaning that, in the case of shortfalls, either
fiscal adjustment or financing is required. Oil
funds can be classified in one of two categories:
stabilisation funds, designed to address the
problems created by the volatility of oil
revenues, and savings funds, established to
save part of the oil revenues for future
generations. In the case of stabilisation funds,
when oil prices are high a portion of oil
revenues is channelled from the government
budget to the stabilisation fund. Conversely,
when oil revenues are low the stabilisation fund
finances the oil revenue shortfall. In this
context, a debate has developed about the
effectiveness of stabilisation funds in
smoothing government spending.
In Norway the authorities established the
Government Petroleum Fund (GPF) in 1990.
The GPF, formally a government account at the
central bank, receives most of the petroleum
revenue and invests it in foreign financial
assets. It can, therefore, insulate the budget
from changes in petroleum income and
preserve the assets for use by future
generations (Skancke, 2003). One such use is to
finance the increase in old-age pensions, and in
2005 the Norwegian government proposed that
the GPF be formally linked to old-age
pensions. No transfers to the GPF took place
until 1995 because of low net oil income and
4 See the BIS Quarterly Review, December 2005.28
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large oil-related expenditures. Since then,
however, the assets of the GPF have increased
rapidly, as oil production and prices have
picked up and the government’s oil-related
investment has declined. At the beginning of
2005 the market value of the GPF was 78% of
mainland GDP. The 2005 budget projects that
the market value of the fund could reach 128%
of mainland GDP in 2010. In 2001 (effective
for the 2002 budget) the policy of saving
petroleum revenue for the future was formally
added to the fiscal guidelines. Within these
guidelines, the key rule sets the non-oil central
government structural deficit to the same level
as the long-run real return on the GPF, assumed
to be 4%. The guidelines allow temporary
deviations from the rule over the business cycle
and in the event of extraordinary changes in the
value of the GPF. The guidelines were meant to
serve a number of purposes, namely to preserve
the capital of the GPF for future generations,
ensure that some petroleum revenue is spent
now, and insulate the budget against sharp
changes in petroleum revenues.
In Russia the authorities established the
Russian Oil Stabilisation Fund (ROSF) to
manage the increasing volume of oil revenues
in February 2004. The Central Bank of Russia
manages the ROSF and may invest the fund’s
resources in both cash and securities. A
beneficial side effect is that investment in the
ROSF helps to curb excessive money supply
growth and to control inflation. Finally, some
oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf
region, such as Kuwait, have also established
oil stabilisation funds. However, the largest
oil-producer, Saudi Arabia, has so far refrained
from doing so.
Some economies with large reserve holdings
have set up heritage funds. These funds manage
reserves in order to achieve higher long-term
returns than central banks and to preserve the
value of reserves for future generations.
However, heritage funds can also have short-
term objectives in terms of fostering activity in
domestic financial centres. In addition they
often serve as a second line of defence when
intervention is required in the context of a
currency crisis. Recent country experiences
include the Government of Singapore
Investment Corporation and the Korean
Investment Corporation.
ANNEX 2
MAIN DRIVERS OF RESERVE ACCUMULATION:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE5
1 BACKGROUND
In past years the accumulation of international
reserves has shown rather unusual patterns, as
described earlier in this paper. In particular,
traditional indicators for “reserve adequacy”
indicate that the stock of international reserves
is substantially in excess in a number of
emerging markets, notably in Asia. This raises
the possibility that other factors might be
driving the rapid accumulation of foreign
reserves.
Consequently, considerable attention has been
focused on the extent to which this
development can continue. In order to evaluate
the sustainability of the factors behind reserve
accumulation, this annex evaluates the main
drivers for emerging markets to accumulate
reserves (i.e. to have an exchange rate target,
ranging from just smoothing out volatility to
more formal objectives). We broadly
distinguish the following issues: first,
international reserves are essential in coping
with often volatile capital flows. In such cases,
higher uncertainty implies a higher optimal
level of reserves. Second, international
developments (such as financial globalisation)
or country-specific factors (such as
demographic issues or temporarily higher
revenues, e.g. from oil exports) can contribute
to the build-up. However, these factors are not
sufficient to explain the build-up: as long as
5 Prepared by P. Maier (De Nederlandsche Bank). Information
on reserve adequacy has been provided by F. Comelli
(European Central Bank). Helpful input from the DNB’s
Financial Stability Division, P. Cavelaars, M. Admiraal, and
other ESCB colleagues is gratefully acknowledged.29
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ANNEX 2
currencies are freely floating, sustained
accumulation of foreign reserves (i.e. beyond a
certain minimum level) is unnecessary and
potentially costly. Hence, there are strong
indications that where the accumulation of
foreign reserves occurs very rapidly and the
stock of reserves is very high, it might result in
exchange rates being managed. For instance,
if countries keep their exchange rates
undervalued as part of an export-led growth
strategy, accumulation of foreign reserves will
continue until the exchange rate is in line with
that required by economic fundamentals.
In particular with regard to policy choices, it is
important to realise that clear differences may
exist between the objectives of private and
public sector investors. For private investors,
the objective is to maximise expected returns
relative to perceived risk. In contrast, central
banks buy and sell foreign assets for policy
reasons that might go beyond trying to
maximise risk-adjusted returns.6
Acknowledging the distinct difference
between private and public sector investors is
essential, in that the medium and long-term
sustainability of a certain policy is not
necessarily impaired if it is economically not
fully optimal. For instance, central banks might
be willing to increase their foreign dollar
reserves for political reasons, even if purely
economic reasoning calls for a slower reserve
accumulation, e.g. if the value of the reserve
currency comes under pressure.
In the following sections we examine first the
extent to which current reserve holdings can be
explained by “insurance” considerations
(Section 2). Section 3 examines the impact of
financial globalisation. Section 3 discusses
policy choices, notably management of the
exchange rate as a means to boost exports. The
last section discusses the main findings and
provides a brief review of the costs associated
with the build-up of international reserves.
2 PRECAUTIONARY MOTIVES
INSURANCE AGAINST CURRENCY DEPRECIATION
One of the traditional motives for central banks
to accumulate international reserves is that
they need foreign currency to weather potential
turbulence on currency markets. In the face of a
deficit in the balance of payments, countries
have various options (use of one or more of
these policies is not mutually exclusive): first,
they can engage in expenditure-switching
policies, such as accepting a lower exchange
rate or imposing tariffs or import quotas.
Second, they can impose expenditure-reducing
policies, effectively reducing economic
growth. Third, they can engage in policies to
stimulate exports. And last, they can finance it
by losing reserves to smooth out short-run
payment imbalances.7
Turbulence on currency markets occurs when
private capital flows suddenly threaten to bring
unwelcome changes in the country’s exchange
rate. When private capital outflows threaten to
weaken the currency, the central bank can sell
reserves and buy domestic assets. When
speculators are suddenly putting upward
pressure on the currency by buying domestic
currency assets, the central bank can attempt to
contain that pressure by selling domestic
currency and accumulating foreign reserves.
The typical example is that foreign investors
suddenly fear that a currency is overvalued and
rush to convert domestic currency assets into
dollars or other reserve currencies. The attempt
to satisfy this demand can sharply reduce the
central bank’s reserve holdings (effectively
redoubling investor incentives to buy foreign
assets before the domestic currency weakens).
Larger amounts of international reserves can
6 Central banks may also take “traditional” investment
considerations into account when managing their reserve
portfolio. The larger the reserve holdings, the more reserve
managers are distinguishing between a liquidity portfolio
(designed to offset exchange rate pressures) and an
investment portfolio. According to a recent study, fourteen of
twenty central banks surveyed now rely on private fund
managers to allocate at least some of their reserve holdings
(International Monetary Fund, 2004).
7 See also Bahmani-Oskooee and Brown (2002).30
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imply that countries can avoid costly
liquidation of assets and can serve as a public
demonstration of a commitment to exchange
rate stability. Moreover, just when an emerging
market most needs reserves – in a crisis – it can
be shut out of the international capital markets
because of sovereign risk concerns.
Additionally, countries may wish to reduce
their dependency on institutions such as the
IMF, if they “do not regard conditional
borrowing rights at the IMF and owned
reserves as perfect substitutes” (Crockett,
1978).
A related problem in this context is that net
capital inflows to developing countries are
largely due to external factors that they cannot
influence (such as reductions in world interest
rates). Although it is not always
straightforward to disentangle “push” from
“pull” factors as determinants for capital flows,
the literature suggests that domestic factors –
such as country-specific productivity shocks or
domestic demand shocks – are relatively less
important (Kim, 2000), though this feature is
likely to have abated in recent years. Countries
might thus suddenly experience capital inflows
or outflows without adequate domestic policies
to deal with them.
Holding foreign reserves as self-insurance
against a currency crisis is especially important
if a currency is overvalued. Mexico, Korea and
Russia, for example, all share relatively recent
experiences with destabilising runs on their
currency during a financial crisis. Against this
backdrop, it should not come as a surprise that
these countries might attach a high value to the
protection derived from large accumulation of
foreign reserves. This argument is less
relevant, however, for undervalued currencies
such as those in most Asian countries (although
it is not always evident whether a currency is
over or undervalued, as e.g. estimates of
“equilibrium exchange rates” can differ vastly
across models).
CAN PRECAUTIONARY MOTIVES FULLY EXPLAIN
RECENT RESERVE ACCUMULATION?
Although reserves may be useful as a tool to
avoid crises, there is a limit to the reserves
needed to prevent financial turbulence
(particularly as holding large currency reserves
can imply costs). Were reserve accumulation
purely driven by precautionary motives, it
should slow down once the “optimal” level of
reserves has been reached. However, this does
not seem to be the case. The main indicator for
gauging the adequacy of foreign exchange
reserve assets is the ratio of foreign assets to
short-term external debt (de Beaufort
Wijnholds et al., 2001). This indicator – also
known as the Greenspan-Guidotti rule –
reflects a country’s ability to service its
existing short-term external debt (debt
maturing within one year) in the event of a


















































1996 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 200431
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 43
February 2006
ANNEX 2
sharp deterioration in the external financing
conditions. Typically, a country is considered
prudent if it holds foreign currency reserves in
the amount of its total external debt maturing
within one year (Rodrik and Velasco, 1999 and
Garcia Soto, 2004). Asian countries have also
been improving their positions in terms of
reserves to short-term debt since 1997, albeit to
different degrees (see Chart 7). One can argue
that part of the accumulation of foreign
reserves that occurred after the Asian currency
crisis was intended to bring the level of
reserves back to the optimal level. Currently,
however, the reserves to short-term external
debt ratios of all the Asian countries considered
are well above one – China, India and Taiwan,
in particular, have very high ratios.8
While the ratio of short-term debt to foreign
assets is the most popular indicator of reserve
adequacy, it is not the only one. The following
ratios can also be used:
– the ratio of international reserves to imports,
which represents the number of months for
which a country could support its current
level of imports if all other capital flows
were to stop. As a rule of thumb, countries
should hold foreign reserve assets in order to
cover their imports for three to four months.
All Asian countries appear to be well above
the threshold (see Chart 8), with the possible
exception of the Philippines where the ratio
was four at the end of 2004. In particular,
according to the reserve to import indicator
for Taiwan, if all capital inflows were
suddenly to stop, this country would be able
to finance nearly two years of imports with
its existing stock of foreign exchange
reserve assets.
– the ratio of reserves to broad money, which
reflects the potential for resident-based
capital flight from the domestic currency. If
the ratio is very close to zero, broad money
largely exceeds foreign exchange reserves.
In the presence of an exchange rate peg, the
higher the increase in monetary aggregates
relative to the stock of foreign reserve
assets, the higher the potential for capital
flight in the event of negative money
demand shocks. This ratio has also increased
for most Asian countries since the 1997
financial crisis, albeit with considerable
variation at the country level (see Chart 9).
Hence, all three methods employed indicate
that international reserves might be in excess in
various Asian economies. More detailed
econometric analysis confirms this picture
(Table 1 provides an overview of recent
studies): until about the late 1990s, reserve
accumulation in Asian emerging economies
could be explained by standard economic
Chart 8 Ratio of reserves to imports
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8 It should be stressed that the values of these indicators
depend on the database used. Using the IMF database yields
different values, but it still shows that the reserves to short-
term external debt ratio is well above 1.32
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factors such as economic size and current and
capital account vulnerability. Since the Asian
crisis, models based on the standard economic
explanatory variables have underestimated the
reserve holdings of several key Asian
countries. This unusual accumulation is a sign
that factors other than purely precautionary
motives might play an important role.9
Taken altogether, the evidence suggests that
limiting vulnerability has probably not been
the primary motive for recent reserve
accumulation in most economies. It should be
noted, however, that determining the “optimal”
level of currency reserves is not
straightforward: in fact, it might also depend on
institutional factors, such as the degree of
capital mobility or financial liberalisation.
Hence, the indicators presented above might, at
least to some degree, underestimate the optimal
level of foreign reserves, as the following
considerations show.
FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION
In a narrow sense, the role of international
reserves as a buffer to smooth shocks to the
balance of payments has not changed.
However, the economic environment wherein
emerging economies operate has undergone
substantial transformation in recent decades:
the capital account of emerging market
economies often displays high volatility, and
countries differ in their conduct of monetary
policy and exchange rate policy. This can
impact on a country’s ability to deal with
sudden capital inflows or outflows, and hence
influence the desired stock of foreign reserves.
In addition, the rapid pace of financial
globalisation provides countries with new
possibilities of diversifying risks or spreading







































IMF (2003) Reserves in various Asian countries are currently in excess. A ratio of reserves to
short-term foreign debt much above one does not further reduce the risk of a crisis.
Aizenman & Marion (2003) Reserve holdings in the period 1980–1996 can be explained by “traditional factors”,
but have been significantly underestimated since the Asian crisis.
Bahmani-Oskooee & Brown (2004) The demand for international reserves may be difficult to estimate correctly as it
experiences structural instability (in particular in the face of shocks).
Table 1 Are international reserves in Asian countries excessive? Econometric evidence
9 While reserve accumulation in Asia might over time have
become disproportionate to the actual threat faced by certain
countries, this does not seem to be the case in most Latin
American emerging market debtor economies. Given their
nature as “original sinners”, these countries are unable to
borrow in domestic currency and, as such, have a particular
incentive to accumulate reserves to self-insure against future
loss of access to international capital markets.33
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 43
February 2006
ANNEX 2
savings geographically in ways that were not
possible several decades ago. And lastly, other
factors can (structurally) exert downward
pressure on a country’s exchange rate, e.g.
demographic developments.
CAPITAL MOBILITY AND FINANCIAL
LIBERALISATION
When estimating a country’s demand for
foreign reserves, empirical studies search for
variables other than the reserves to short-term
debt ratio, which can reduce the probability of a
currency crisis. Good macroeconomic
fundamentals are an important and necessary
condition for avoiding currency crises, albeit
an insufficient one. As economies that are more
open to trade are relatively more vulnerable,
empirical studies such as Lane and Burke
(2001) or Edwards (2004) generally find that
trade openness is a very important variable in
explaining cross-country variation at the level
of international reserves. Moreover, there is a
link between a country’s financial system and
capital mobility on the one hand and the build-
up of foreign reserves on the other. High capital
mobility can be a cause of current account
instability (Wong and Carranza, 1999), and
with greater financial integration governments
accumulate more international reserves (Mody
and Murshid, 2005). One explanation is that
opening the capital account while maintaining
an inflexible exchange rate regime can be a
precursor to a crisis, as e.g. the “tequila crisis”
of 1995 or the Asian/Russian crises of 1997/98
have shown.10
The link between financial deregulation and
the capital account on the one hand and
(speculative) currency inflows on the other has
been recognised since the Asian crisis (Kawai
1998). In Thailand, for instance, the
combination of de facto fixed exchange rates
and high interest rates generated excessive
capital inflows. This led to too much liquidity
chasing bad investments. The build-up of
short-term, unhedged debt left East Asian
economies vulnerable to a sudden collapse of
confidence. Rapid capital outflows and the
consequent depreciation of currencies
exacerbated the strains on private sector
balance sheets.
3 THE “GLOBAL SAVINGS GLUT”
Recent empirical evidence points to an
increasing erosion of the home bias in savings
(International Monetary Fund 2005b). In a
closed economy, investment equals saving in
each period; but in a world of financial
globalisation, countries have more ample
possibilities to smooth consumption over time
or to finance investment in the face of
insufficient domestic savings. Hence, as saving
can cross international borders, a country’s
domestic investment and domestic saving need
not be equal in each period.
In the view of Bernanke (2005), recent
economic and demographic developments in
many industrialised countries have contributed
to a “global savings glut”. Declining birth rates
and an ageing population will result in a
pronounced increase in the proportion of the
elderly to the active population in all
industrialised countries. In contrast, the
population structure in most developing Asian
countries is pyramidal, reflecting their younger
population (to some extent China is an
exception). Such differences in population
developments will affect international capital
flows. First, everything else being equal (e.g.
assuming stable monetary policy, etc.), the
population ageing in industrialised countries is
likely to lead to an increase in savings by the
younger generation in the short to medium
term. If these higher savings by the young are
not offset by dissaving on the part of the
elderly, or if the proportion of elderly people in
the population is not above a certain threshold,
a country’s saving rate is likely to increase.
10 Capital restrictions, however, are not likely to alter the
picture substantially. Glick and Hutchinson (2005) find that
restrictions on capital flows do not effectively insulate
economies from currency problems; rather, countries with
less restrictive capital controls and more flexible exchange
rate regimes appear to be less prone to speculative attacks.
This holds even after controlling for macroeconomic,
political and institutional characteristics that influence the
probability of a currency crisis.34
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Second, in industrialised countries the ageing
population (and the associated slowdown in
labour force growth) is likely to exert
downward pressure on the return to capital,
relative to that of labour.
Lastly, it is worth noting that sudden changes in
revenues from oil exports can also influence
savings of oil-exporting countries. As oil
revenues are highly volatile and unpredictable,
several oil exporters have set up funds to
smooth revenue flows over time or to save part
of the oil revenues for future generations. This
provides an additional explanation as to why
countries such as Russia and Norway have
increased their stock of international reserves.
4 MANAGEMENT OF EXCHANGE RATES
We have seen so far that emerging markets may
want to accumulate reserves to counter
turbulence on currency markets and that the
optimal stock of reserves might actually be
relatively high, given the increase in capital
mobility, the weaknesses of the domestic
banking system, etc. In addition, there are
factors such as demographic developments that
provide additional explanations for existing
capital movements. That said, these last
factors, as well as current account surpluses, do
not necessarily lead to a build-up of foreign
reserves, provided that the exchange rate is
fully flexible. In other words, the fact that the
accumulation of reserves has occurred over a
long period and has reached very high levels,
and the speed with which those reserves were
built up, indicates that the exchange rates were
managed, i.e. not floating freely.
KEEPING THE EXCHANGE RATE UNDERVALUED
Various Asian countries ran sizeable current
account surpluses in the early 2000s, and many
also received substantial net private capital
inflows. If regional central banks had not offset
these foreign exchange inflows with official
outflows – i.e. reserve purchases – Asian
currencies would have strengthened.11 Dooley
et al. (2003) argue that various Asian countries
keep their exchange rates deliberately
undervalued as part of a development strategy
(the so-called “Bretton Woods II” system of
fixed exchange rates). By keeping their
currency undervalued, emerging countries
deliberately stimulate export growth, which in
turn fosters economic growth (e.g. by building
up a competitive domestic capital stock).
Given that Asia trades mostly with the United
States, the choice of the US dollar as the
primary reserve currency is not surprising.
This hypothesis has generated considerable
controversy (see e.g. Roubini and Setser,
2005). A fixed or relatively rigid exchange rate
system can yield benefits in terms of
macroeconomic stability, especially to low-
income countries where financial market
development is limited and the capital market
closed (Rogoff et al., 2004). Although most
authors agree that various Asian countries
follow policies to keep their currency
undervalued, much of the controversy is related
to the question of whether this is optimal and
whether such policies can be sustained for a
prolonged period. China, for example, has a
rural population of 200 million underemployed
workers yet to be absorbed into the modern
sector. Eichengreen (2004) estimates that
China can accomplish this at the rate of only
10 million to 20 million a year.12 In his view,
the possibility exists that China could attempt
to stick to its strategy of export-led growth for a
decade or more.
5 COSTS OF MANAGING EXCHANGE RATES,
AND “SOCIALISATION” OF EXCHANGE
RATE RISK
In theory, central banks can deliberately
(“structurally”) keep their currency
undervalued over a sustained period. However,
11 For economies pegged to the US dollar, reserve accumulation
has resulted automatically from the authorities’ pledge to
buy foreign currency as necessary to maintain the fixed rate.
How much stronger the currencies might have been without
recent large reserve purchases is unclear (Higgins and
Klitgaard 2004).
12 In making these calculations, Eichengreen does not account
for other possible sources of Chinese income growth (e.g.
from favourable productivity developments), which may bias
his estimates.35
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 43
February 2006
ANNEX 2
it is far from clear whether such a strategy is
economically optimal over the medium and
long term. For instance, it has been pointed out
that domestic financial market structures have
undergone substantial changes since the
Bretton Woods period: financial deregulation
has limited the scope for funnelling forced
saving into capital formation in specific
sectors. Moreover, maintenance of a fixed
exchange rate regime can be difficult in
practice, and its benefits may erode over time,
while exchange rate flexibility becomes more
valuable as economies mature and become
integrated with global markets.
Maintenance of a fixed exchange rate regime
can often mask underlying policy and
institutional weaknesses, and result in the
build-up of various sorts of imbalances. For
instance, not letting one’s currency appreciate
implies that tradable goods are too cheap on
world markets, which inflates the returns on
investment for tradable goods. This can result
in overinvestment, in particular in the tradable
goods sector. These problems can be
exacerbated by an open capital account, as e.g.
domestic firms and financial institutions may
react to the perception of limited foreign
exchange rate risk by taking on foreign
currency debt.
If a country becomes an international creditor,
its external assets may remain largely
denominated in foreign currency but
mismatches in national balance sheets will
emerge. As holdings of liquid assets in US
currency are not balanced on the liability side,
any significant appreciation of the domestic
currency vis-à-vis the US dollar would imply
(potentially sizeable) capital losses. For
instance, Roubini and Setser (2005) estimate
that if adjustment were postponed, China’s
capital loss could easily exceed 20 percent of
its GDP by 2008.13
Lastly, if at some point a revaluation becomes
necessary, valuation losses on foreign currency
holdings occur.
Some of these risks – e.g. valuation losses or
mismatches in balance sheets – can be shifted
from the private sector to the central bank by
means of reserve accumulation. Hence,
building up international reserves can also be
used as a means of “socialising” the negative
consequences of currency and interest rate
movements, i.e. preventing the negative
implications of capital flows on the private
sector.14 In such cases, central banks
effectively act as financial intermediaries,
channelling domestic saving away from local
uses and into international capital markets.
This can be because domestic financial systems
are ill-equipped to deal with flexible exchange
rates (Prasad et al., 2005), or because weak or
underdeveloped financial systems do not
provide sufficient tools to hedge against
currency movements (McKinnon and Schnabl,
2003).15
6 UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES
Reserve accumulation can also occur in the
form of unconventional monetary policy
measures. In Japan, for instance, conventional
monetary policy has been rendered ineffective
by the zero interest bound and bad loan
problems in the banking sector (Garton, 2005).
Moreover, the country’s economic
performance has been negatively affected by
deflation. In such circumstances, monetary
policy can essentially only be conducted by
managing the country’s exchange rate. An
appreciating currency would have enhanced
downward pressure on the country’s inflation
rate. By keeping the exchange rate stable, or
13 The People’s Bank of China is not simply lending China’s
current account surplus back to the United States. Around
75% of China’s reserve accumulation in 2003-04 was
financed by capital inflows, not China’s current account
surplus (Roubini and Setser, 2005).
14 Foreign reserves can also be used to recapitalise (state-
owned) banks, as in China in 2003 and 2005.
15 China’s approach of opening up to FDI rather than other
types of capital inflows has helped to insulate it from many
of the risks associated with capital account liberalisation.
But the dominance of FDI in China’s total capital inflows has
declined markedly in recent years, implying that the
composition of inflows is likely to be increasingly driven by
market forces rather than the desires of policymakers (Prasad
et al., 2005).36
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even allowing for a gradual weakening of its
domestic currency by accumulating foreign
reserves, the effectiveness of monetary policy
can be increased.
ANNEX 3
RISKS TO AND CHALLENGES FOR THE CONDUCT
OF MONETARY POLICY16
1 BACKGROUND
Reserve accumulation harbours a number of
risks for the conduct of monetary policy. First,
inconsistencies among monetary policy
objectives (price versus exchange rate
stability) can evolve. Second, reserve
accumulation may also entail risks for the
financial sector and medium-term growth
prospects. In addition, quasi-fiscal costs of
sterilisation, defined here as the difference
between the yields received for holding foreign
assets and yields paid on domestic liabilities
issued for sterilisation purposes, may arise.
Particularly in the presence of continuous net
capital inflows, interventions on currency
markets to prevent exchange rate appreciation
may lead to an excessive easing of domestic
monetary conditions which could then threaten
price stability. The underlying reason is that if
such interventions are not fully sterilised, the
monetary base rises and the resulting
additional liquidity increases the ability and
willingness of commercial banks to supply
credit. With interventions as large and
persistent as those recently observed in Asia,
however, it might become more difficult to find
eligible instruments with which to absorb the
intervention-related rise in the liquidity
reserves of the banking system. One possibility
is the issuance of new government securities or
central bank paper.17 Another possibility could
be a drastic increase in reserve requirements,
which would reduce the amount of banks’
excess liquidity.18 Moreover, in connection
with capital inflows, monetary policy might be
hindered by a snowball effect. Continued
intervention to prevent exchange rate
appreciation might give rise to expectations of
exchange rate appreciation and further
encourage capital inflows. In addition,
sterilisation – considered in isolation – keeps
domestic interest rates elevated, thereby
attracting even higher capital inflows. For this
reason, there is only limited leeway for
discretionary interest rates hikes in order to
rein in excessive credit growth. This implies
that, under such conditions, the central bank
might have to accumulate more and more
reserves in order to offset upwards pressures on
the exchange rate.
Reserve accumulation may also facilitate the
emergence of domestic imbalances,
specifically if interventions are not fully
sterilised and excessive liquidity is generated.
On the credit supply side, in the presence of
abundant liquidity domestic financial
intermediaries might be encouraged to grant
credit more easily and to relax their assessment
of borrowers’ creditworthiness. On the credit
demand side, lax monetary conditions exert
downward pressure on interest rates and may
encourage excessive domestic investment,
either in the tradable or in the real estate sector.
In this context, domestic imbalances may result
and the implications for medium-term
economic growth are negative, posing a
significant challenge for monetary policy-
makers. Finally, continuous reserve
accumulation might also imply quasi-fiscal
costs, which are here defined as the difference
between the yields received for holding foreign
assets and the yields paid on domestic
liabilities issued for sterilisation purposes.
Specifically, these costs may entail losses for
reserve-accumulating central banks if an
unfavourable foreign-domestic interest rate
differential develops.
16 Prepared by G. Leichtlein and A. Kreye (Deutsche
Bundesbank).
17 In some Asian countries (China, Singapore, Taiwan and
Korea) part of the sterilisation effort has been carried out via
the issuance of central bank paper.
18 However, raising reserve requirements is not a costless
option as it could put commercial banks at a competitive
disadvantage vis-à-vis non-bank institutions. The share of
intermediation handled by the banking sector might
decrease.37
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2 INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND




Interventions on currency markets are carried
out by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) on behalf of the
Ministry of Finance (MoF). The MoF finances
the purchase of foreign assets by selling
Financial Bills (FBs) via auctions to market
participants. Thus the effect on the monetary
base is virtually neutral. However, for a limited
period of time, the central bank can directly
underwrite FBs from the MoF before they are
auctioned to the markets.19 Therefore, the
effects of reserve accumulation on the
monetary base in Japan are kept under control.
HONG KONG SAR
Hong Kong is among the largest holders of
foreign exchange reserves but its reserves have
changed only slightly since 2000. The
exchange rate regime adopted in Hong Kong is
a currency board system, which requires that
both stock and flows of the monetary base are
fully backed by US dollars held in Hong
Kong’s Exchange Fund. The link between the
Hong Kong dollar and the US dollar is
maintained through an automatic interest rate
adjustment mechanism, whereby interest rates
adjust to inflows or outflows of funds, creating
the monetary conditions that counteract the
original capital movement. On 18 May 2005 the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority announced a
“refinement” of the exchange rate system. The
former link of HKD 7.8 to one US dollar was
gradually changed into a fluctuation band with
HKD 7.75 and HKD 7.85 as margins. The
introduction of the convertibility zone around
HKD 7.8 was aimed at removing uncertainty
about the extent to which the exchange rate
may appreciate and should also reduce the
usage of the Hong Kong dollar as a vehicle for
speculation on a revaluation of the Chinese
currency. Under this new system, when the
HKD/USD rate approaches the upper boundary
(HKD 7.75), investors should have the
confidence to sell US dollars for Hong Kong
dollars if they believe in the central bank’s
commitment to buy all available US dollars in
the market at the upper boundary. In this case,
domestic interest rates should move to close the
gap with US rates.
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Given the considerable pace of reserve
accumulation, the People’s Bank of China
(PBC) has been countering current account
surpluses, foreign direct investment and
speculative inflows with sterilisation and
additional measures. Sterilisation in the
presence of continuous inflows might, under
certain circumstances, become costly. For
instance, in 2004 the PBC had to resort
increasingly to currency interventions and, in
order to sterilise the ensuing domestic
monetary expansion, conducted large-scale
open market operations. Specifically, the
issuance of central bank securities for
sterilisation purposes reached 15% of M0 in
2004, up from 5% in 2003.
On 21 July 2005 the PBC announced a reform
of the exchange rate regime that came into
effect the next day. The reform included an
immediate appreciation of 2% to 8.11 renminbi
per US dollar. For the US dollar the band of
±0.3% around the central parity is maintained,
while for other currencies the daily band has
been widened to ±3% (from ±1.5 %) around the
central parity. For the US dollar the central
parity rate is determined by a weighted average
of market opening bid prices from market
makers before 9:15 am on the same trading
day.20 This implies that the opening price may
be different – possibly outside the ±0.3% band
– from the closing price of the previous
business day. In addition, the exchange rate of
the renminbi is determined by “a managed
floating exchange rate regime based on market
19 Such operations would smooth the potential disturbance of
the money market arising from a large-scale issuance of FBs
within a short period of time. Moreover, for the public, it
conceals the scale of interventions. FBs underwritten by the
BoJ must be redeemed by the government as quickly as
possible.
20 Previously the US dollar central parity rate was based on the
previous day’s closing price.38
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supply and demand with reference to a basket
of currencies” (People’s Bank of China, 2005).
However, despite this reform the build up of
foreign exchange reserves has been continuing
in a context of large basic balance surpluses.
Prior to the exchange rate reform, the PBC had
raised the reserve requirements ratio and
employed interest rate policy measures,
including the increase in benchmark deposit
rates and lending rates. Moreover, the
authorities also tried to slow investment
growth through administrative measures to
curb excessive credit growth. In parallel,
several measures to ease capital outflows have
been introduced since October 2003.21
INDIA
In India reserve accumulation amounted to
roughly USD 30 billion in 2003. In 2004
foreign exchange reserves grew further and
reached about USD 125 billion at year-end. In
2002 and 2003 the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
sterilised about 70% and 60% of the
intervention-related increase in reserve money
respectively. The stock of government
securities available to the RBI for sterilisation
purposes declined progressively. In order to
enable liquidity absorption, at the beginning of
2004 it was decided that the Government would
issue treasury bills and dated securities to be
used exclusively for sterilising purposes. As in
China, the authorities in India adopted
administrative measures to discourage capital
inflows, including a tightening of the
requirements on external commercial
borrowing. To ease outflows, restrictions on
overseas investment and lending were loosened
and the prepayment of foreign loans was
simplified. However, persistent inflationary
pressures and sterilisation costs, which add to
high fiscal deficits, make it more difficult for
the Indian authorities to reconcile their
external and domestic policy objectives.
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
In Korea, the management of foreign exchange
reserves lies with the Ministry of Finance and
Economy (MoFE), but is partly delegated to
other authorities, including the Bank of Korea
(BOK). The BOK manages the bulk of the
country’s foreign exchange reserves. In its role
of undertaking matters relating to the issuance
and redemption of government bonds, the BOK
is entrusted by the MoFE with the operation
and management of Foreign Exchange
Stabilisation Fund bonds. The central bank
inter alia issues Monetary Stabilisation Bonds
(MSBs) to control money supply. Sterilisation
of the intervention-related growth in the
monetary base has increased over the past
years. In 2002 nearly 60% was sterilised while
in 2003 the additional liquidity generated by
interventions was almost completely sterilised.
In 2004 Korea’s foreign exchange reserves rose
by USD 43.7 billion, the bulk of which (USD 25
billion) was accumulated during the fourth
quarter. Nevertheless, in the same quarter the
Korean won appreciated by 10% against the US
dollar. As the outstanding amount of MSBs
increased considerably in 2004, all the
liquidity caused by foreign exchange
intervention has been sterilised. In 2004 the
BOK posted a loss of 150.2 billion won, its first
loss since 1994. The deficit was largely the
result of interest payments on MSBs being
higher than returns earned on foreign assets and
of exchange rate losses which were marked to
market.
SINGAPORE
Foreign exchange interventions by the
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)
amounted to USD 16.5 billion in 2004, of
which USD 10.2 billion took place in the fourth
quarter. The MAS manages the Singapore
dollar against a trade-weighted basket of
currencies of Singapore’s major trading
partners. In April 2004 the MAS shifted its
stance from zero appreciation of the nominal
effective exchange rate to a modest and gradual
appreciation, with the aim of reducing the risk
of imported inflation. The central bank’s
money market operations do not target a policy
21 For example, China liberalised exchange restrictions on
individual overseas travel, encouraged certain types of
domestic firms to invest abroad, and initiated a scheme to
induce domestic institutional investors to increase their
outward investment. In addition, the regulation of foreign
currency holdings for certain enterprises has been relaxed.39
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interest rate but aim at providing liquidity for
the banking system that is sufficient for banks
to maintain the minimum reserve requirement
ratio of 3%. According to the MAS (2001), in
order to smooth short-run volatility in the
exchange rate, the central bank intervenes in
currency markets from time to time. The
intervention operations aim to keep the trade-
weighted value of the Singapore dollar within a
specified band. Institutional features that have
supported the effectiveness of the MAS’
intervention are the government’s fiscal
surpluses and the surpluses of the Central
Provident Fund.22 These surpluses are placed in
deposits with the MAS, thereby withdrawing
liquidity and putting upwards pressures on the
exchange rate. The MAS engages in either
money market operations or (non-sterilised)
foreign currency interventions to offset this
liquidity withdrawal.
TAIWAN, PROVINCE OF CHINA
The Central Bank of China (CBC) has
intervened significantly on foreign exchange
markets in recent years. In 2002 and 2003 the
CBC absorbed liquidity by more than the
intervention-related expansion in the monetary
base. Sterilisation was lower in 2004 at 85%.
The intermediate target for monetary policy in
Taiwan is M2. Thus, a surge of broad monetary
aggregates should induce the CBC to carry out
offsetting operations. The main instruments are
certificates of deposits, issuance of which grew
much less in 2004 than in the two preceding
years, with much of the increase taking place in
the first two quarters.
ANNEX 4
THE FOREIGN POSITIONS OF SEVEN ASIAN
CENTRAL BANKS: TRENDS AND POTENTIAL
RISKS23
1 BACKGROUND
The building up of foreign exchange reserves
creates an exposure to foreign currency-related
risks. The larger the absolute level of reserves,
the larger the potential risks and the need for
appropriate risk management. Given the often
dominant role, in reserve-accumulating
countries, of the US dollar as the denominator
of most foreign transactions and the anchor for
exchange rate policy, foreign exchange
reserves are usually mostly denominated in this
currency. The related risks that monetary
authorities face are largely similar to those
faced by private agents with currency
exposure, and can be classified into (i) market
(i.e. currency and interest rate) risk, (ii) credit
risk and (iii) liquidity risk. The main market
risk is given by the potential for valuation
losses on the securities denominated in the
international anchor currency. In fact, if
authorities were to abandon or modify their
link to this currency and/or be forced into
domestic currency appreciation, they would
experience an immediate loss on the asset side
of their balance sheet.
When assessing the trends in net foreign assets
in the balance sheet of central banks, two
preliminary aspects have to be borne in mind.
First, the growth in foreign currency reserves is
not always fully reflected in central bank
balance sheets. Japan, where the Ministry of
Finance holds the greatest share of foreign
exchange reserves, is a case in point, as
illustrated below. Moreover, in countries such
as China the central bank is not independent of
the government24. Second, foreign assets have
to be assessed net of foreign liabilities. Since
both components may vary widely, including in
terms of relative weight, the net foreign
position is the most comprehensive measure of
the external exposure of central banks and,
therefore, the appropriate variable to assess the
related risks.
22 The Central Provident Fund is a mandatory-defined
contribution savings scheme for Singapore residents.
23 Prepared by M. Soudan (Nationale Bank van België/Banque
Nationale de Belgique).
24 A short description of the different institutional
arrangements underlying the management of foreign
exchange assets for the seven countries surveyed in this
paper is provided in Section 4 of this annex.40
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2 TRENDS IN THE NET FOREIGN POSITION
OF SEVEN ASIAN CENTRAL BANKS
Chart 10 plots the net foreign position of seven
Asian central banks on a monthly basis from
January 1995 to April 2005, and shows that
those banks built up substantial net foreign
assets in this period. At the end of 1995 the total
sum of net foreign assets within this group was
USD 458 billion. The yearly growth rate of the
net foreign position increased from about 10%
in 2000-01 to 29% in the period ending in
December 2004. The net foreign assets of these
central banks totalled USD 1,484.9 billion at
the end of April 2005, thereby having tripled in
only eight years.
Chart 11 shows that not all of these central
banks have contributed in equal measure to the
rise in net foreign assets. The share of the Bank
of Japan (BoJ) declined from 24.7% of the total
at the end of 1995 to 1.8% in April 2005. In fact,
the BoJ significantly reduced its net holdings
of foreign assets in April 1998 (to USD 27.2
billion from USD 183.8 billion at the end of
March 1998) in line with the arrangements with
the MoF. The Monetary Authority of Singapore
(MAS) and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(HKMA) also witnessed a decreasing share, the
former from 15.0% at the end of 1995 to 7.7%
in April 2005 and the latter from 10.6% to 7.6%
in the same period. Conversely, three central
banks increased their share in total net foreign
assets: the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the
Bank of Korea (BoK) and the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI). Their combined share rose from
29% at the end of 1995 to 66% in April 2005.
While in 1995 the BoJ was, in our sample, the
central bank with the highest net foreign assets
on its balance sheet, in April 2005 it was the
PBC that held the highest share.
Table 1 shows the ratio of net foreign assets to
central banks’ total assets, the latter as reported
on their balance sheets. The table points to a
rise in the importance of net foreign assets in
the total assets of all considered Asian central
banks, except for the BoJ and the MAS. At the
end of 2004 the net foreign assets of the six
central banks excluding the BoJ represented,
on average, 73% of total assets, with a 15
percentage point increase in five years. The rise
Chart 11 Relative net foreign asset
positions of seven Asian central banks
(December 1995-April 2005; percentages)
Source: IMF, except for Taiwan Province of China, for which



















1.9  1.8 7.2 14.5
14.3  14.6
15.0
12.3 8.1  7.7













People’s Bank of China
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
Reserve Bank of India 
Bank of Japan
Bank of Korea
Monetary Authority of Singapore
Central Bank of China (Taiwan)
Chart 10 Net foreign position of seven Asian
central banks
(USD billions)
Source: IMF, except for Taiwan Province of China, for which



















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
People’s Bank of China
Bank of Japan
Central Bank of China (Taiwan)
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
Bank of Korea
Sum
Reserve Bank of India
Monetary Authority of Singapore41
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 43
February 2006
ANNEX 4
was particularly rapid in the cases of the RBI,
BoK and PBC.
Summing up, the central banks of China, Korea
and India experienced a sharp rise in their net
foreign asset positions in the period 1995-
2004, while the positions of other central banks
remained more stable or declined, thus leading
to greater concentration of net foreign assets in
a few central banks. Those central banks also
experienced an increase in the relative
importance of foreign assets in their balance
sheets, thereby affecting the potential for
foreign currency-related risks.
3 POTENTIAL COSTS OF NET FOREIGN
ASSET HOLDINGS
The rising importance of net foreign assets in the
balance sheet of a central bank increases its
exposure to currency risk, which, ideally, should
be mitigated with a commensurate increase in
the capital base. It is true that, in principle,
central banks do not need capital as they issue
currency on which no interest payment or other
payments need to be made. If, however, a central
bank is potentially subject to large profits and
losses, an adequate capital base might prove
desirable as it would allow running (foreign
exchange-related) losses for a sustained period
of time without the need for recapitalisation
through a transfer of public funds. A substantial
capital base thereby contributes to central bank
financial independence.
In Table 2 the central bank capital base has
been calculated as the sum of paid-up capital,
reserves, and accumulated profits minus losses
and provisions for foreign exchange losses;
these items have been properly identified in
publicly available sources.25 The table reports
the central bank capital base in terms of the
balance sheet total for the period 1995-2004,
and shows that the relative importance of the
capital base fluctuates greatly across the seven
Asian central banks observed. Excluding the
BoJ, the capital/balance sheet ratio remained
stable at 9.0% to 9.5% between 1995 and 2003,
but fell to 6.9% in 2004 mainly due to a drop in
the capital base of the BoK26 and in the net
worth of the Central Bank of China (Taiwan),
coupled with a very rapid rise in total assets. A
closer examination of the balance sheets reveals
that some central banks (RBI, CBC, HKMA
and MAS) have increased their capital base,
whereas others have refrained from doing so.
The dissimilar trends in the capital base,
combined with the diverse speeds at which
central banks have been accumulating foreign
assets, have led to very different rates at which
net foreign assets are covered by capital and
reserves. Table 3 provides an overview and
shows that the importance of net foreign assets
25 A short description of the calculation of the capital base for
each central bank is provided in Section 4 of this annex.
26 The observed volatility of the capital base of the BoK in the
period 1997-2004 is entirely caused by the fluctuations in the
Exchange Revaluation Reserve (see Section 4).
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China N/A N/A N/A N/A 41 39 45 45 49 59
Hong Kong 82 87 86 74 69 77 80 87 86 85
Taiwan 84 82 86 84 84 89 88 88 88 90
India 28 29 39 38 43 46 50 63 74 89
Japan N/A N/A N/A 4 4 4 3 3 2 2
Korea 36 40 9 35 60 73 79 81 85 82
Singapore 99 100 100 100 98 95 95 95 95 96
Total N/A N/A N/A N/A 29 32 35 37 38 42
Total (excl. Japan) N/A N/A N/A N/A 58 59 63 64 68 73
Table 1 Net foreign asset as a percentage of total assets in the balance sheets of seven Asian
central banks
Source: IMF, except for Taiwan Province of China, for which the source is the Central Bank of China.
Notes: End-of year data except for Reserve Bank of India (mid-year data). Because of data limitations some data points are missing.42
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in relation to the capital base has been
increasing since 1995, especially during 2004.
Excluding the BoJ, the sum of net foreign
assets for the other six Asian central banks was
almost 11 times larger than their combined
capital base at the end of 2004.
Chart 12 plots the ratios to nominal GDP of net
foreign assets in the balance sheets of the seven
Asian central banks. These ratios have risen
since 1995, once again with the exception of
the BoJ. Excluding this central bank, the others
held, on average, net foreign assets equivalent
to 37% of GDP at the end of 2004, compared
with only 17% in 1998. The relative importance
of net foreign assets vis-à-vis GDP has
increased not only in small open economies but
also in the two larger economies of China and
Korea, and at the end of 2004 it reached its
highest level since 1995. Net foreign assets in
the balance sheets of the PBC and the BoK
represented 34% and 27% of GDP respectively
at the end of 2004.
Summing up, the following conclusions can be
drawn. First, the capital base of most reserve-
accumulating Asian central banks relative to
the total balance sheet remained stable during
the period 1995-2003 but decreased in 2004.
Second, net foreign assets are currently greater
than the capital base in all the central banks
under review, excluding the BoJ.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3
Hong Kong 34.8 32.3 29.9 26.6 29.0 30.0 30.9 34.3 38.0 39.9
Taiwan 4.5 6.1 15.6 16.3 10.1 12.3 14.5 14.8 14.7 9.7
India 9.5 12.3 11.4 15.7 16.2 18.0 17.7 23.4 21.9 20.5
Japan N/A N/A N/A 5.5 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.7
Korea N/A N/A 31.5 13.5 9.7 12.8 12.8 7.9 9.4 2.3
Singapore N/A 4.9 7.2 9.7 10.7 9.6 8.2 10.4 9.6 9.2
Sum N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.7 7.1 7.1 6.9 6.9 5.5
Sum (excl. Japan) N/A N/A N/A N/A 9.1 9.6 9.5 9.1 9.2 6.9
Table 2 Capital base as a percentage of the total balance sheet total of seven Asian central
banks
Source: IMF, except for Taiwan Province of China, for which the source is the Central Bank of China.
Notes: Figures for the Reserve Bank of India are mid-year figures. Figures for the Monetary Authority of Singapore are March
figures in the subsequent year. All other figures are end-of-year figures.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China N/A N/A N/A N/A 39.4 42.6 54.5 103.8 139.5 211.0
Hong Kong 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1
Taiwan 18.7 13.5 5.5 5.1 8.3 7.2 6.1 5.9 6.0 9.3
India 3.0 2.3 3.4 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.7 3.4 4.4
Japan N/A N/A N/A 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
Korea N/A N/A 0.3 2.6 6.2 5.7 6.2 10.2 9.0 35.8
Singapore N/A 20.5 13.9 10.2 9.1 10.0 11.6 9.5 10.0 10.3
Sum N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.3 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.6 7.7
Sum (excl. Japan) N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.3 6.2 6.7 7.0 7.4 10.6
Table 3 Ratio of net foreign assets over capital base for seven Asian central banks
Source: IMF, except for Taiwan Province of China, for which the source is the Central Bank of China.
Notes: Figures for the Reserve Bank of India are mid-year figures. Figures for the Monetary Authority of Singapore are March
figures for the following year (e.g. the ratio of 20.5 in the “1996” column for the MAS is actually a March 1997 figure). All other
figures are end-of-year figures.43
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RELATED TO THE MANAGEMENT OF
FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES
In order to better asses the risks related to the
foreign exchange exposure of reserve-
accumulating Asian central banks, this final
section summarises the institutional
arrangements underlying the management of
foreign exchange reserves in each of the seven
countries under scrutiny. Specifically, the
section examines whether balance sheet risks
related to a country’s foreign exchange
reserves are borne by the monetary authority or
the Ministry of Finance, and to what extent.
Where available, this section also provides
information on whether foreign currency-
denominated financial instruments are marked
to market or valued at cost.
JAPAN
The Japanese Ministry of Finance (JMoF) is
responsible for exchange rate policy and the
management of foreign assets in the Foreign
Exchange Fund Special Account (FEFSA)
system. The FEFSA system consists of two
elements: the Foreign Exchange Fund and the
Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account. The
former is a fund established for foreign
exchange trading by the government and is
financed by the issuance of short-term
government financing bills. Funds in the
FEFSA are used to conduct interventions in the
foreign exchange market. The financial results
of foreign exchange trading, such as profits or
losses and payment or receipt of interest, are
recorded in the Foreign Exchange Fund Special
Account and are, therefore, part of overall
government revenues and expenses.
Interventions are executed by the BoJ, which
acts as the agent of the JMoF. The BoJ does
normally not take part in the financing of
foreign exchange operations. However, from
January to March 2004 the BoJ entered into an
agreement with the JMoF to purchase foreign
securities held by the FEFSA in order to
provide yen for FEFSA operations. Purchases
by the BoJ were conditional on their repurchase
within three months. Total purchases by the
BoJ were limited to JPY 10 trillion (slightly
under USD 100 billion). The agreement was
initiated because the FEFSA had, at that time,
virtually exhausted the room for short-term
borrowing under budgetary appropriations.
The capital base of the BoJ has in this section
been calculated in accordance with the
definition in the BoJ’s 2004 Annual Report,
namely as the sum of capital, special and legal
reserves, as well as provisions. The BoJ is only
liable for valuation gains/losses on foreign
assets and liabilities recorded in its own
balance sheet. At the end of 2004 the net
foreign assets of the BoJ represented only 3%
of total foreign exchange reserves in Japan.
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The State Council is in charge of approving the
monetary and exchange rate policy of China.
The PBC carries out monetary policy and
oversees the exchange rate policy implemented
by the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (SAFE), which is also responsible
for regulating foreign exchange transactions,
managing the country’s foreign exchange
reserves and developing its foreign exchange
market. The SAFE is a government agency
directly reporting to the PBC.
Chart 12 Net foreign assets of seven Asian
central banks in percentage of GDP
(percentages)
Sources: IMF, except for Taiwan Province of China, for which
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The formulation of foreign exchange policy is a
shared responsibility of the Ministry of
Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the BoK.
The MOFE is responsible for the overall
foreign exchange policy and is empowered to
set guidelines on the pursued external value of
the won and to decide foreign exchange
intervention accordingly. The formulation of
foreign exchange policy is also, to a certain
extent, delegated to the (BoK) in keeping with
its inflation targeting rule. Foreign exchange
interventions are executed by the BoK, which
holds and manages the nation’s foreign
exchange reserves together with the MOFE and
Korea Investment Corporation. Losses and
gains made on BoK transactions are recorded in
its income statement. The capital base of the
BoK has been calculated as the sum of capital
(i.e. the sum of the legal reserve, voluntary
reserve and net profit for the period) and the
Exchange Revaluation Reserve (ERR).
Valuation losses on foreign exchange holdings
are not recorded in the income statement, but
are accounted for directly in the balance sheet
of the BoK through the ERR, which is part of
the item “Other current liabilities”.
TAIWAN PROVINCE OF CHINA27
Exchange rate policy is normally formulated
and executed by the CBC. The central
government may restrict the foreign currency
operations in the event of severe balance of
payments deficits or when the stability of the
domestic economy is endangered. The Taiwan
Ministry of Finance is in charge of the
government foreign exchange transactions,
including the management of foreign debt.
Rules relating to the settlement of foreign
exchange transactions are set jointly by the
CBC and the Ministry of Finance. In 1989
Taiwan moved to a regime of managed float.
Although the bilateral exchange rate of the new
Taiwan dollar (NTD) vis-à-vis the US dollar is
in principle set by the market, the central bank
intervenes to avoid currency volatility and to
maintain orderly foreign exchange market
conditions.
INDIA
The RBI is responsible for formulating and
executing foreign exchange policy, in
consultation and close cooperation with the
government. The RBI’s foreign exchange
policy is communicated through regular policy
statements and speeches by the Governor or
other high-ranking officials. The current
exchange rate policy can be described as a
managed float: the RBI does not have a fixed
exchange rate target, but intervenes in the
foreign exchange market to dampen excessive
volatility when necessary. The RBI also holds
and manages the nation’s foreign exchange
reserves, which are part of its balance sheet. In
this section, the capital base of the RBI has
been defined as the sum of capital paid-up, the
reserve fund, the contingency reserve, the
currency and gold revaluation account and the
exchange equalisation account. Gains and
losses on the valuation of foreign currency
assets and gold due to movements in the
exchange rate and/or prices of gold are not
booked on the profit and loss account but
instead accumulated on the balance sheet under
the name Currency and Gold Revaluation
Account (CGRA). The balance in the CGRA at
the end of June 2004 was positive, equivalent to
11.5% of the foreign currency assets and gold
holdings of the RBI, compared with 13.4% at
the end of June 2003. Foreign securities held by
the RBI other than treasury bills are valued at
the lowest of book value and market price.
Depreciations are adjusted against current
income.
HONG KONG SAR
Exchange rate policy is formally set by the
Financial Secretary of Hong Kong SAR and is
executed through the Exchange Fund operated
by the HKMA. The latter also executes the
necessary monetary policy operations to
safeguard HKD convertibility. Reserve assets
27 The CBC does not provide information on how it deals with
profits or losses on foreign exchange transactions, nor does
it provide information on how foreign assets and liabilities
are valued in its books. The capital base of the CBC has been
defined as the net worth of the CBC.45
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are, therefore, an integral part of the balance
sheet of the HKMA. Reserves in the Exchange
Fund are managed as two portfolios: the
Backing Portfolio and the Investment
Portfolio. The Backing Portfolio is used to
back the monetary base of Hong Kong. The
Investment Portfolio is used to preserve the
value and long-term purchasing power of
assets. The capital base of the HKMA as it has
been defined in this section equals the
Exchange Fund equity. According to the notes
included with the balance sheet in the HKMA
Annual Report, exchange gains and losses on
foreign currency conversions (very small
because of the fixed peg) are included in the
income and expenditure account in “Net
exchange gains/losses”. More importantly,
foreign securities are stated on the balance
sheet at fair value at the balance sheet date. The
fair value of a financial instrument represents
its market price where there is a published price
quotation in an active securities market. Where
such a market price is not available, the fair
value of a financial instrument represents its
valuation according to a price matrix of
discounted cash flows using applicable interest
rates for discounting. Changes in the fair value
of these investments are recognised in the
income and expenditure account in “Net
realised and revaluation gains/losses on other
investments in securities” as they arise. In 2004
they accounted for 34.3% of total income and
50.7% of the surplus for the year.
SINGAPORE
The foreign exchange reserves of Singapore are
managed by the MAS, which also sets
exchange rate policy. Singapore operates a
managed float regime along the lines of a so-
called “band-basket-crawl” arrangement, the
aim of which is to limit currency volatility and
secure domestic price stability. The exchange
rate policy targets the nominal effective
exchange rate (NEER), but the exact
composition of the basket that is used to
calculate the NEER, normally made up of the
currencies of major trading partners, is not
made public. In order to instil adequate
confidence in its exchange rate policy, the
MAS operates a Currency Fund which holds
foreign exchange reserves at least as large as
the total of domestic currency in circulation.
The bulk of Singapore’s reserves are held in the
General Reserve Fund. Together, these two
funds make up the financial assets and
liabilities of the MAS. The capital base of the
MAS has been defined as the sum of the balance
sheet items issued and paid-up capital, general
reserve fund and currency fund reserves. Gold
and foreign assets, including derivative
instruments, are stated on the balance sheet of
the MAS at the lower of cost and market value
on an individual investment basis, except for
shareholdings in the BIS and S.W.I.F.T. Gains
in the market value of foreign assets are not
recorded on the balance sheet.
ANNEX 5
DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL BANK RESERVE
MANAGEMENT AND THEIR POSSIBLE MARKET
IMPLICATIONS28
1 BACKGROUND
The increase in the size of foreign reserves in
recent years has made the choice of an adequate
reserve management framework an important
issue for central banks. It is necessary for such
a framework to: i) be consistent with the
exchange rate policy features; ii) seek an
efficient risk-return trade-off; and iii) avoid
market distortions. Against this backdrop, this
annex reviews developments in foreign
exchange reserves and their composition, in
terms of both currency and instrument
allocation. It also elaborates on the various
frameworks for reserve management methods
observed among the ten largest holders of
foreign reserves, and compares the US and euro
area bond markets in order to find out whether
there are differences that could limit a potential
currency diversification. Finally, the annex
outlines how the accumulation of foreign
reserve might affect bond market dynamics.
28 Prepared by A. Lagerblom (European Central Bank) and
G. Levy-Rueff (Banque de France).46
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2 MAIN TRENDS IN RESERVE MANAGEMENT
SINCE 1999: DIVERSIFICATION, BUT TO
WHAT EXTENT?
Given the accumulation of foreign reserves
over the past years, there is a trend among
reserve managers towards a diversification of
their portfolios. Diversification, however, can
take place in two dimensions, namely across
currencies and across asset classes.
DIVERSIFICATION IN TERMS OF CURRENCY
COMPOSITION: A MARKET VIEW
The underlying principles, as outlined in the
Box, support the view that changes in the
currency composition of foreign reserves are
likely to occur very gradually. This is due to the
fact that the reasons determining a specific
choice of currency composition, including the
role of the dominant international foreign
reserve currency (which has changed over time
but is currently clearly considered to be the US
dollar), are unlikely to change rapidly.
According to Eichengreen (1998 and 2005) for
example, the importance of the depth, breadth
and stability of the financial markets and the
degree of international transactions have
always played a decisive role when
determining reserve currencies. In that respect,
the incumbent world reserve currency holds an
advantage in term of network externality. This
is particularly the case in Asia, given the role of
the de facto dollar zone.29 In addition, central
banks in general try to avoid swift changes in
the main characteristics of their foreign reserve
management framework, since they can be a
source of market disturbances.
When trying to carry out a more detailed
analysis of recent currency composition trends,
one is confronted with the fact that the
information available on currency composition
Box
POSSIBLE FACTORS DETERMINING THE CURRENCY COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN RESERVES
– The currency composition of reserves usually reflects a country’s exchange rate regime
and, if the exchange rate regime is not a pure float, is closely linked to the choice of an
anchor currency or basket.
– One issue specific to Asia is the de facto existence of a dollar zone (in the strong or weak
sense) in the region with many Asian currencies more or less strictly linked to the dollar.
Given the strong inter-twinned commercial links in the region, this makes the weight of the
dollar in the foreign exchange policy of Asian countries more important than the simple
weight of the United States.
– Official reserves, in particular in developing countries with fragile access to international
capital markets, are considered to be a cushion for paying for imports and ensuring the
servicing of external debt in foreign currencies. Therefore, the reserve currency
composition is often linked to the composition of trade and financial flows.
– Moreover, risk management considerations and optimal asset allocation approaches seem
to have gained in importance recently.
– Finally, central banks also take into consideration, to the extent that it is compatible with
their other objectives, the “market neutrality principle”, as prescribed by the IMF.
29 In this regard, see also Genberg, McCauley, Park and Persaud
(2005) and Ho, Ma and McCauley (in BIS, 2005b).47
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is generally vague and that, if it is published, it
is only with a substantial time lag (to avoid any
negative market impacts). This is particularly
true for most Asian countries.
IMF data are still the most relevant statistics
which are publicly available. They show
gradual changes in the currency composition of
foreign reserves since 1999, with the share of
US dollar holdings, at a global level, at its peak
with 71% in 1999.30 Since then, however, the
share of US dollar holdings has declined,
standing at 65.9% at the end of 2004. When
limiting the analysis to developing countries,
the share of the US dollar seems to be slightly
lower, i.e. 59.8% at the end of September 2005.
The aggregated share of euro holdings
increased from 17.9% in 1999 to 24.3% at the
end of September 2005 according to the latest
available data from the IMF Currency
Composition of Official Foreign Exchange
Reserves (COFER) database (with the specific
trend in developing countries being very
similar to the general picture). However, as
regards the share of euro holdings, the
appreciation of the euro also contributed to
positive valuation effects in recent years.31
These shares, however, are calculated only for
the group of countries reporting reserve
currency composition to the IMF, accounting
for around 70% of world reserve holdings
(excluding important reserve accumulating
countries).
The gradually increasing use of the euro in
global foreign reserves has been supported by
the smooth functioning of the euro area and the
euro’s appreciation against other international
currencies in recent years.32 It is noteworthy
that, according to the recent survey of trends in
reserve management conducted by Central
Banking Publications in 2004 (Pringle and
Carver, 2005), 70% of the sample group
reported an increase in euro exposure. Of the
50% of the sample that reported a reduction in
US dollar exposure, 93% reported that their
exposure to the euro had increased. One stated
reason for this trend is the advantage of
diversification in terms of an improvement in
the risk-return trade-off. While a precise
country or regional breakdown for all
currencies in foreign reserves is not available,
partial evidence suggests that the bulk of
reserves of the ten largest holders are in US
dollar-denominated financial assets.
Overall, the concentration of foreign reserve
holdings in US dollar assets remains
significant, particularly in Asia. This is related
to the foreign exchange regimes adopted in
several Asian countries, often characterised by
de facto pegs against the US dollar, and the
composition of their external trade, dominated
by links with the United States and the dollar
zone.33 However, it is also related to a different
reason: the desire to improve the risk-return
trade-off through diversification, not just at the
level of the central bank but at the aggregate
country level. A diversification advantage at
the aggregate national level might exist when
the central bank invests part of the national
savings – which are otherwise invested in the
domestic currency because of the home bias in
domestic financial markets – in US dollar
assets. Home bias is decreasing as shown in the
IMF April 2005 World Economic Outlook
(2005b), but it remains significant, in
particular in certain countries. For example, in
China34 the home bias can be extreme because
of regulatory constraints. The central bank
might therefore perceive an advantage in
accumulating foreign assets on behalf of the
rest of the Chinese economy and see only a
30 See the IMF’s Annual Report 2005, which shows some
significantly revised data for the currency composition of
official foreign exchange reserves over the past years. Please
note that in the IMF’s own admission, these data are not fully
reliable. It should also be noted that the IMF introduced a
new presentation regarding the estimation of the currency
composition of reserves in 2005, which makes any direct
comparison with the old presentation impossible.
31 A more accurate way of analysing the relative change is to
look at the ratio of quantities for all countries: in 1999 there
were 3.9 times more dollars held than euro, but at the end of
2003 reserve managers held only 2.6 dollars per euro.
32 See the Review of the international role of the euro, ECB,
January 2005.
33 Genberg et al. (2005), for example, argue that the dollar
share of foreign reserves is not out of line with the share of
the dollar zone measured in the world GDP.
34 China is not covered in this specific IMF WEO analysis,
which focuses mainly on developed countries.48
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limited advantage in diversifying out of the
dollar into other foreign currencies at this
stage, since a good part of the benefit of
diversification is already obtained by investing
in dollars for the entire country, while further
currency diversification would only add
marginally to this first order effect. This
supports the idea that a possible diversification
of foreign reserves out of the US dollar in China
could only be implemented at a slow pace.
As regards possible market impacts, central
banks with large foreign reserve holdings are
aware that some of their moves might generate
volatility in the US dollar or international bond
markets, even if doing so would also inflict
significant losses on them.35 The fact that the
authorities might stop purchasing US dollars
and US Treasuries (even without talking about
net selling) is seen by market participants as a
risk for volatile US dollar movements and
higher US bond yields.
DIVERSIFICATION IN TERMS OF INSTRUMENT
COMPOSITION: A MARKET VIEW
The instruments in which reserve managers
invest the bulk of their foreign reserves have
also changed to a certain degree over the last
decade. On the one hand, changing financial
markets (e.g. the shrinking stock of
outstanding US Treasuries at the end of the
1990s and in the early part of the 2000s) forced,
to some extent, traditionally conservative
reserve managers to enlarge the eligible asset
class spectrum for their portfolios. Better
portfolio management skills, technical know-
how and risk management tools have also
helped to promote a diversification of foreign
reserve portfolios towards new instrument
classes given the advantages of this
diversification in terms of decreasing risks and
enhancing returns. However, the changes have
been slow. Most foreign reserve management
activities, compared with private portfolio
management activities, still seem to have
specific features which may make them more
likely to have an impact on the market.36
As McCauley and Fung (BIS, 2003a) summed
up, the reserve manager’s choice of instrument
has showed three successive phases. In the
mid-1970s, reserve managers began to
diversify their short-term holdings out of US
Treasury bills into private money market
instruments or BIS instruments to obtain higher
yields, which consequently also meant
accepting greater credit risk. In a second phase,
the maturity of their reserve holdings was
extended, thus accepting larger market risk.
Although comprehensive data on the maturity
structure of US Treasuries held in foreign
reserves are not available, the findings of
McCauley and Fung are corroborated by the
views of other market participants. In addition
to the desire for more diversification, the
market context, characterised by declining
yields in the 1990s, led reserve managers to
wish to enhance returns by purchasing US
Treasuries with longer maturities. More
structurally, numerous researchers have found
that, for investors with a medium to long-term
investment horizon, extending the duration
generally allows a positive term premium to be
earned (of course at the price of greater profit
and loss volatility).
In the last and most recent phase, which started
at the end of the 1990s, reserve managers
shifted some of their longer-term securities
away from US Treasuries into securities with
higher credit risk, in order to earn the
additional yield spread pick-up. Hence, for
example, the securities issued by government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), also referred to
as US agencies, were not only used by reserve
managers as a substitute for the shrinking US
Treasury market, but also to enhance returns in
a relatively low-yield environment. However,
35 For example, rumours regarding the possible diversification
of reserves by the Bank of Korea in February 2005 triggered
a 2% appreciation of the Korean won against the US dollar,
which meant a 2% loss for the Bank of Korea’s reserve
holdings (valued in KRW terms).
36 Official institutions including central banks are often
scrutinised by market participants because the amounts that
they trade are large and because the investment strategy of
such institutions can change abruptly and independently of
interest rate levels (in contrast to the behaviour of private
foreign investors).49
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one can note that, according to the US Treasury
International Capital (TIC) system report37, the
amount of GSE securities acquisitions by
official institutions peaked in 2000, with net
acquisitions of approximately USD 41 billion.
Although there is a significant discrepancy
between the US Treasury’s TIC report and the
Federal Reserve’s custody GSE securities
holding data, other evidence points in the same
direction.
There is a range of data sources that track the
instrument composition of foreign official
investments denominated in US dollar assets.
In addition to the IMF and the BIS, the US
Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) also record
foreign official holdings of US reserves.
However, each data source differs in i)
coverage, ii) timing, iii) valuation, and iv)
methodology for recording holdings.
Furthermore, due to confidentiality issues,
disclosures have limitations and it is not
possible to conclude with certainty from the
published data the precise amount of each kind
of asset held by foreigners, i.e. private or
official investors. Therefore, any conclusions
about the foreign ownership of US marketable
securities as presented hereafter are drawn
cautiously. Furthermore, the following
analysis is restricted to US dollar reserve
holdings only, as only limited data are yet
available for euro-denominated securities.
Table 1 below shows changes in the
composition of US dollar reserves by
instrument types from March 2000 to June 2004
and is based on an analysis carried out by
McCauley and Fung (BIS, 2003a). The data
cover investments in the United States, as
captured by the US Treasury TIC data, and
dollar deposits held outside the United States
in banks captured by the BIS international
banking statistics.
The data confirm that central banks have been
marginally diversifying away from US
Treasuries to other assets within their US dollar
reserve portfolios. Recent evidence, as
outlined in the survey by Pringle and Carver
(2005), suggests that central banks remain
committed to diversifying portfolios further in
terms of assets. Many central banks are still
diversifying into higher-yielding instruments
and securitised bonds. However, the bulk of
March  2000 June 2000
Short Long Short Long
term term Total in % term term Total in %
Treasury securities 165 492 657 58 249 923 1,172 52
Other assets 262 211 473 42 635 434 1,069 48
Repos and deposits in the United States 32 32 3 141 141 6
Money market paper 104 104 9 93 93 4
Offshore deposits 126 12 138 12 401 37 438 20
Agency securities 91 91 8 216 216 10
Corporate bonds 12 12 1 47 47 2
Equity 96 96 8 134 134 6
Total 427 703 1,130 100 884 1,357 2,241 100
Memo:
Total US dollar reserves end-1999 1,359 end-2004 2,334
Sources: BIS Quarterly Review, March 2003, “Choosing instruments in managing dollar foreign exchange reserves”, R. N.
McCauley, B. S. C. Fung, March, Basel; BIS Quarterly Review, September 2005, “Distinguishing global dollar reserves from
official holdings in the United States”, R. N. McCauley, Basel.
Table 1 Instrument composition of US dollar reserves
(in USD billions)
37 See the US Department of the Treasury,
http://www.treas.gov/tic/fpis.html.50
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their assets continue to be concentrated in
traditional instruments such as bank deposits,
BIS instruments and US Treasuries (as well as
agency securities, though to a lesser extent). It
can be concluded that, while the changes in the
management of foreign reserves have been
significant, they do not seem as important as
the magnitude of reserve accumulation.
3 THE COEXISTENCE OF VARIOUS FOREIGN
RESERVE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS
Given the rapid growth of foreign reserve
holdings over the past years and the risks and
costs associated with it, greater focus has been
given to the management framework for such
foreign reserve portfolios. Central banks have
been and are still diversifying along the yield
curve and across asset classes, by taking on
more interest rate and credit risk in search of
higher yields, but they are doing this to
different extents. In addition, in some countries
with large reserve holdings, not all reserves are
invested in highly liquid and secure sovereign
issues.
For example, natural-resource-based
stabilisation funds have been created, like
Norway’s Government Petroleum Fund and the
newly established Russian Stabilisation Fund.
These funds are typically thought of as a by-
product of national budget surpluses, with
excess budget revenues coming from the export
of natural resources. In contrast to the
Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund,
which in addition to providing short-term fiscal
stabilisation across the oil price cycle acts as a
mechanism for transferring wealth from
current resource exploitation to future
generations, the Russian Stabilisation Fund is
designed almost solely to serve short-term
purposes (i.e. fiscal targets). The assets of such
stabilisation funds are not accounted for in a
country’s reserve holdings, since they do not
come from and are not being used for foreign
exchange intervention. They might appear, in
some cases, on a central bank’s balance sheet as
a separate “foreign assets” item, but their
origin is not foreign exchange intervention.
More generally, parts of the reserve holdings
are sometimes transferred to separate
institutions. This set-up has already been in
place in some countries for several years, as is
the case with the Government of Singapore
Investment Corporation (GIC), and it is being
put in place in countries such as Korea38. Such
separate institutions can, to some extent, be
seen as external managers mandated by the
respective central bank, with the foreign
reserve assets remaining on the balance sheet
of the central bank. The Bank of Korea, for
example, retains the option to recall the assets
in the event of an emergency, meaning that the
funds would effectively be retained by the
central bank as international reserves while
being entrusted to the KIC for management.
However, in the case of the GIC, some of the
inflows come from accumulated budget
surpluses and workers contributions to the
Singapore Central Provident Fund (CPF), a
national pension scheme, i.e. they are not
related to the central bank’s foreign reserves.
The main objective of these institutions is, in
general, to achieve higher long-term returns in
order to preserve the value of the assets for
future generations (hence they are sometimes
referred to as “future generation or heritage
funds”).
4 US AND EURO AREA FIXED INCOME
MARKETS: CAN DIFFERENCES LIMIT
CURRENCY DIVERSIFICATION?
How could the differences between US and
euro area fixed income markets limit currency
diversification? On the other hand, if such
diversification were to take place abruptly,
could this mean a specific impact on euro area
bond markets?
A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE US AND
EUROPEAN FIXED INCOME MARKETS
According to the 2005 Global Financial
Stability Review published by the IMF, the size
of the US bond market is close to USD 20,500
billion compared with USD 13,500 billion for
38 The Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) began its
operations on 1 July 2005.51
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the euro area. Of these totals, government debt
amounts to USD 5,000 billion in the United
States compared with USD 5,500 billion in the
euro area (with, however, some fragmentation
since the Italian government debt market is
close to USD 1,500 billion, France and
Germany are close to USD 1,000 billion each
and Spain is close to USD 500 billion according
to the BIS quarterly review of March 2005).
Finally, non-government debt securities (e.g.
corporate debt securities, asset-backed
securities, etc.) amount to USD 15,500 billion
in the United States compared with USD 8,000
billion in the euro area.
In brief, it should also be observed that the
European secondary bond market, in contrast to
the European primary market, is still relatively
narrow compared with the US secondary bond
market. Interviewees surveyed for a study
carried out by BearingPoint39 estimated that
the average daily turnover of the secondary
fixed income market in the euro area falls in a
range between €60 and 65 billion. More than
70% of the average daily turnover (approx.
€44-50 billion) takes place in the German,
Italian and French government bond markets.
Compared with the US Treasury market, this
represents only 1/4 of the average daily
turnover (about USD 250 billion), as estimated
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The
US agency securities market on its own seems
to be almost comparable, in terms of turnover,
to the size of the European government bond
market, with an average daily turnover of
approximately USD 45 billion.
Due to the difference in market sizes and
depths, large cash investors are therefore
inclined to favour the US bond market over the
euro area market. Differences in market
liquidity also tend to attract investors first
towards the US bond market before they
diversify into the euro area market. Based on an
informal survey of nearly a dozen of the main
market makers in the US and euro area bond
markets, the US market indeed remains
somewhat more liquid in terms of bid-offer
spreads and the standard size of transactions.
However, the differences are not that large, and
nor are they similar for all bonds (e.g.
depending on their maturity; on-the-run
compared with off-the-run US Treasuries;
government debt compared with agency or
corporate debt; etc.).40
In fact, according to the central bank survey
carried out in autumn 2004 (Pringle and Carver,
2005), the importance of the euro area as an
international investment centre is growing and
this is making the fixed income markets in
particular ever more attractive to many reserve
managers. Over half of the respondents to the
survey indicated indeed that euro area markets
are now as attractive to invest in as those in the
United States.
The growing use of derivatives, e.g. futures or
interest rate swaps, also means that the
liquidity of cash instruments is now less
important since trading can be disentangled
from liquidity management. In general, the
derivative markets have a very good depth and
liquidity, both in the euro area and in the United
States.41
Therefore, the difference in size and structure
between US and euro area markets should be
neither overestimated nor underestimated.
While only 37% of international bonds and
notes are denominated in US dollars, the fact
that they are, in general, traded in more
homogeneous and liquid markets than other
currencies certainly provides a partial reason
for the concentration of dollar assets and the
limited diversification into the euro by Asian
39 See BearingPoint, The electronic bond market 2005, Study
Documentation, Frankfurt, 2005.
40 The difference seems to be the largest in the money market
area, with the six-month US Treasury bill bid-offer spread
announced at between 0.25 and 1 basis point, while a spread
on similar instruments in the euro area is shown between 1
and 2 basis points (or even 4 basis points for one
counterparty). For ten-year benchmark government bonds,
several counterparties show similar spreads in the US and
euro area markets (or even tighter spreads in the euro area,
but the dispersion seems higher there with several
counterparties also showing significantly worse spreads than
for US markets).
41 See, for example, Jones G., Citigroup saga highlights the
need for change, Financial News, 5 September 2004.52
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central banks. It also means that there is an
additional potential risk of distortion for euro
area long-term interest rates, should Asian
central banks invest more in euro area markets.
BACKGROUND DATA ON THE MAJOR HOLDERS OF
US AND EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SECURITIES
As pointed out earlier, there is a range of data
sources that track foreign official investments
and holdings in US assets. However, no
comparable data are available for the euro area
market as a whole, due to its – in this sense –
fragmented structure. Only limited data can be
retrieved from national debt agency offices or
central banks, and from these data only rough
conclusions can be drawn as regards the
holders of euro area financial securities.
In the United States, the estimated share of
total long-term securities in total outstanding
stock (debt instruments and equities) held by
foreigners has increased from 9.7% in March
2000 to 14.3% (i.e. an amount of USD 5,418
billion) as of June 2004.42 In comparison,
approximately USD 588 billion worth of short-
term securities are held by foreigners. No split
is provided here between official and private
foreign holdings. However, according to the
US Treasury, the share of foreign official
holdings in total foreign portfolio investment
in the United States was quite high in the period
from 1974 to 1984, when it stood at around
40%, compared with the figure of
approximately 24% (or USD 1,320 billion)
published in June 2005. This drop can probably
be explained by the fact that the increase in
foreign official holdings has been outpaced by
the increase in foreign private holdings. From
1984 onwards the percentage of foreign official
holdings fell steadily, but it has rebounded
slightly in the last two surveys.
The report further confirms that foreign
officials invest primarily in US Treasury debt,
but that they have also increasingly invested in
US agency and corporate debt. Foreign private
investors still hold the bulk of their US
investments in equities, with the share in US
Treasury pretty much unchanged. Finally, and
more specifically, as of June 2004 foreign
holdings of US Treasury securities represented
52% of the total US Treasury debt outstanding,
up from 35% in March 2000, with the majority
(around 63%) held by foreign official
institutions.
When looking at the maturity structure of US
debt held by foreign official investors, the US
Treasury report shows that, as of June 2004,
over 73% was held in securities maturing in
five years or less, with a concentration in issues
maturing in one to three years. The picture is
similar when focusing only on US Treasury
bonds. However, this is very much in line with
the maturity structure of outstanding
marketable US Treasuries in 2004, with only
34% of marketable public debt outstanding
held in securities with maturities of more than
five years. In short, foreign official portfolios
seem to concentrate on short to medium-term
maturities rather than the longer end of the
curve, which, however, corresponds to the
maturity structure of outstanding debt.43
Focusing on US Treasury securities only,
the US Treasury also publishes, on a monthly
basis, the major foreign holders split by
country or between foreign official and
foreign non-official holdings. However, any
conclusions about foreign ownership are to be
drawn cautiously, as the US Treasury itself
points out that the data are imperfect.44
Based on this data, Japan’s US Treasury
holdings in 2004 were more than three times the
42 See US Treasury (2005), Report on foreign portfolio
holdings of US securities as of 30 June 2004, Department of
the Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 2005.
43 It should be borne in mind that the same market risk is
obtained through an investment of USD 1 billion in ten-year
notes or around USD 15 billion in six-month bills.
44 For example, the “custodial bias” contributes to the large
recorded holdings in major financial centres, including
Belgium, the Caribbean, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom, as some foreign owners entrust the
safekeeping of their securities to institutions that are neither
in the United States nor in the owner’s country of residence.
The UK and Caribbean holdings of US Treasuries are
difficult to analyse, as the data represent a mixture of foreign
central bank activities, petrodollar recycling and global
hedge fund activities.53
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 43
February 2006
ANNEX 5
amount of the second largest holder (mainland
China). Hence, Japan was responsible for over
half of all US Treasury foreign purchases during
the whole of 2004, although the vast majority of
those purchases took place within the first half of
2004. Japan’s position as a consistently large
buyer of US Treasury securities is a function of
its foreign exchange interventions to prevent
appreciation of the Japanese yen: the Japanese
monetary authorities do not dynamically adjust
the currency composition of their reserves, so
most of the proceeds remain in US dollars. When
comparing the TIC data with the data published
by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF), 85%
of the stock of Japanese foreign exchange
reserves is invested in foreign securities, with
the bulk held in US Treasuries. Therefore,
Japanese authorities hold a particularly large
amount of US Treasuries compared with other
foreign institutions.
China’s demand for US assets arises from
foreign exchange interventions like in the same
way as for Japan, and China’s foreign asset
purchases were, until July 2005, somewhat
more automatic than Japan’s due to the
renminbi’s fixed exchange rate against the US
dollar. Therefore, one of the most common
assumptions is that China has also been
allocating large amounts of foreign currency
reserves into US Treasuries. However, the TIC
data do not support this assumption, probably
given the “custodial bias” (see footnote 45),
which may understate the actual US Treasury
holdings by mainland China. Furthermore,
China’s exposure to the US dollar is only
partially shown by the TIC data since, unlike
the MoF, the People’s Bank of China invests in
a more diversified asset base. Finally, the
consequences of the change in the Chinese
currency regime in 2005 will need to be
monitored. For the time being it is too early to
expect swift significant changes since the
renminbi de facto continues to be closely
pegged to the dollar. But the Chinese
authorities have now more freedom i) to let the
renminbi float over time, and hence to buy less
foreign currencies, ii) to shift the currency
composition of their purchases in order to
decrease the focus on the US dollar, and iii) to
change their foreign reserve management
framework more generally.
For the euro area, the IMF’s Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), based on
end-2002 data, shows that the United States
held the largest portfolio claims on the euro
area, followed by the United Kingdom, Japan
and Switzerland. While the United States held
mainly equities, the United Kingdom and Japan
held mainly debt securities. However, the CPIS
data do not provide any geographical
breakdown for securities held as reserve assets
and international organisations’ portfolio
investment holdings. The IMF therefore
conducts two complementary surveys to
establish a geographical breakdown of
securities held as reserve assets. In 2003, for
example, 55% of the securities held as reserve
assets or in international organisations’
investment portfolios were issued by US
residents, while only 28% were issued by euro
area residents even though, compared with
1997, assets issued by US residents have
declined at the expense of assets issued by euro
area residents (which is in line with the
development in the currency composition of
reserve portfolios). The split between short and
long-term debt in US assets was 30%/70%,
while in euro area assets 80% were accounted
for by long-term debt and the remaining 20% by
short-term debt.45 While it can be presumed
that official holdings of foreign reserve assets
denominated in euro, which amount to
approximately USD 740 billion, are to a large
extent held in German and French long-term
securities, no conclusions can be drawn as
regards the geographical breakdown of the
central banks and institutional organisations
holding such euro area foreign reserve assets.
Although this brief analysis is far from
exhaustive, it should be noted that no other
reliable data source was found that would show
a decomposition of major holders of Italian,
45 In the euro area, more specifically, the majority of assets
(over 78%) held by official institutions are assets issued by
Germany and France.54
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 43
February 2006
German and French government debt. None of
the countries analysed publishes a breakdown
of non-resident official and non-resident
private holders of sovereign debt, and hence it
is difficult to draw conclusions as clear as those
in the analysis provided for the US Treasury
debt market. In brief, however, it can be
concluded that, compared with the US Treasury
market, only a minor share of euro area
government debt securities are held as reserve
assets, with the large bulk held by euro area
resident investors (e.g. insurance companies,
mutual funds and other financial institutions).
5 MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF EXCESSIVE
FOREIGN RESERVE ACCUMULATION IN
TERMS OF POSSIBLE DISTORTIONS OF
CURRENT BOND MARKET DYNAMICS
Overall, this contribution has shown that there
is evidence that foreign reserve portfolios are
still managed under much stricter constraints
than private portfolios; investment decisions
regarding foreign reserves are also less price-
sensitive than those made by private portfolio
managers. Therefore, the two types of portfolio
are not completely interchangeable, which
might explain their different market impacts.
An additional set of arguments supporting the
view that central banks’ foreign reserve
investment might have a market impact lies in
the behaviour of investment banks reacting to
the actions of central banks themselves. First,
in line with experience and the order flow
approach (which shows that such flows can
sometimes have a greater impact than
economic fundamentals), there is every reason
to believe that market makers profit from their
information regarding the action of central
banks and, in particular, their US Treasury
purchases. In this context, they have a bias
towards trading on the expensive side of the
market. Second, market participants often
perceive changes in central bank foreign
reserve strategy as partly policy-related and,
therefore, containing specific information
(also because reserve management often lacks
transparency); this can trigger specific market
moves or magnify market volatility.
Any market impact is also likely to depend on
the context in which it takes place. In recent
years large purchases of US Treasuries by
Asian central banks have coincided with
increasing demand from pension funds and life
insurance companies. In addition, both the US
monetary and fiscal policy stances have
significantly changed and impacted markets
during that period with, in particular, the
decrease in US Treasury supply given the
budget surpluses around the turn of the century
and the deflation fears of 2002-03. Therefore, it
is difficult to disentangle all the various factors
which have contributed to low interest rates.
ANNEX 6
THE IMPACT OF ASIAN RESERVE ACCUMULATION
ON ASSET PRICES46
1 BACKGROUND
Long-term interest rates in the United States
have remained low or even decreased in recent
years, defying expectations of significantly
higher rates associated with robust nominal
GDP growth, increasing public deficits and,
perhaps more surprisingly, the gradual but
persistent tightening in official interest rates
which began in June 2004. The persistently low
levels of yields and the atypical behaviour
depicted by the increasing path of short-term
rates versus stable or decreasing long-term
rates have been given names such as the bond
puzzle or the interest rate conundrum47. The
possibility of an interest rate misalignment,
which could add to mounting disequilibria and
ultimately lead to a disorderly correction of
imbalances, has raised concerns.
However, despite the extensive literature
developed to explain this puzzle, the question
46 This contribution has been prepared by Teresa Balcao Reis
(Banco de Portugal) and Emiliano González Mota (Banco de
España), with input from Lucia Cuadro-Sáez and Sergio
Gavilá (Banco de España).
47 The expression conundrum refers to long-term yields and
was introduced in Chairman Alan Greenspan’s semi-annual
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (US
Senate).55
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remains controversial of whether the
persistence of yields below currently assessed
fair value has been due to a change in the
economic and financial fundamentals
underpinning bond prices or to special factors
which may be impeding the correct functioning
of financial markets. This contribution aims to
assess the extent to which interest rates are
below expected equilibrium values because of
the “captive demand” for US Treasuries arising
from foreign exchange interventions by Asian
central banks.
2 THE ROLE OF CHANGES IN THE RELATIVE
SUPPLY OF TREASURIES ON YIELDS:
A REVIEW OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
“HIGH FREQUENCY” DATA
Under the assumptions of frictionless financial
markets and perfect substitution among asset
classes, changes in the relative supply of
securities do not affect their relative returns.
Returns would be determined by the joint
action of “fundamentals” and arbitrage
operations which would guarantee that no
misalignment among asset returns occurs. The
majority view among financial economists is in
line with the behaviour described by the
frictionless model. Accordingly, pricing of
assets in the US financial markets should not
be affected by changes in their relative supply.
For the purposes of this contribution, if
these assumptions were to hold, even large
reductions in the net supply of Treasuries
(because of strong demand from Asian central
banks) should not have an impact on interest
rates.
However, some studies48 support the
hypothesis of imperfect substitution among
asset classes so that changes in the relative
supply of assets have an impact on returns.
Indeed, Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004)
present some evidence supporting the view that
financial assets are not perfect substitutes and
that changes in the relative supplies of
securities do matter for their relative returns.
They present an event study in which three
episodes49 leading to changes in the expected
relative supply of Treasury securities affected
long-term yields. The second episode, i.e. the
massive foreign official purchases of US
Treasury securities by the Bank of Japan, is
intimately related to the aim of this
contribution. Bernanke et al. (2004) show,
using daily data, that Japanese interventions
from 3 January 2000 to 3 March 2004 had an
impact on two, five and ten-year Treasury
yields on dates around the Japanese
interventions. These results clearly support a
role for changes in the relative asset supply of
assets in the determination of yields.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that these
results hold even if all days with major US data
releases are excluded from the sample. Thus, a
common econometric difficulty in this kind of
exercises, i.e. a possible joint endogeneity of
variables, is to a great extent circumvented in
their estimations. However, this study
considers only the very short-term impact of
Japanese interventions on yields, i.e. the
impact on the days surrounding the
interventions (from t-2 to t+2). An immediate
question related to their exercise is what effect
remains, if any, after this very short period is
over.
“LOW FREQUENCY” DATA
Alternative studies have examined the extent to
which Asian reserve accumulation plays a role
in explaining the low levels of the changes in
long-term interest rates in the United States
with a longer perspective. Unfortunately,
available evidence linking foreign official
purchases of Treasuries and US yields is rather
inconclusive. The estimates of the impact
differ substantially and are subject in most
cases to econometric caveats. The range of the
results is quite ample, from negligible effects
to sizable effects as big as 200 basis points.
48 See Roley (1982), Friedmand and Kuttner (1998).
49 These episodes are 1) the announcement of debt buybacks
that followed the emergence of budget surpluses in the
United States in the late 1990s; 2) the massive foreign
official purchases of US Treasury securities by the Bank of
Japan; and 3) the apparent expectations among market
participants in 2003 that the Federal Reserve was likely to
embark on targeted bond purchases.56
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The methodology used by those who support
their assessments with time series analysis
consists of regressing either changes in US
bond yields or the discrepancy between current
rates and estimated equilibrium rates, on
measures of intervention or foreign official
Treasury purchases. The list of studies is quite
extensive and the most relevant ones are
summarised in Table 6 of the main part of the
Task Force’s report at the beginning of this
paper.
3 A MODEL TO EXPLAIN THE IMPACT OF
ASIAN RESERVE ACCUMULATION ON
TEN-YEAR TREASURY YIELDS
The model presented hereafter builds on
previous works and presents a reduced form of
the so-called fundamental bond yield model,
which will be used to regress the discrepancy
between the model results and current yields on
Asian official net purchases of Treasuries.50
In the long-term relationship, US ten-year
interest rates are explained as a function of
monetary policy stance, inflation expectations
and fiscal deficits. Thus, bond yields depend on
a set of current fundamentals and a measure of
likely changes in the relative supply of
Treasuries. Moreover, the base relationship
implicitly admits the principle of imperfect
substitution among financial assets.
Otherwise, changes in the relative supply of
Treasuries arising from public deficits or from
captive purchases of Treasuries from Asian
central banks would have no effects on yields.
Afterwards, the behaviour of the short-term
relationship is obtained by using an error
correction model.
The model differs from others because it
explicitly incorporates the role of inflation
expectations in the determination of long-term
interest rates, whereas other models use the
three-month interest rate compound in a single
variable, the actual monetary stance and
expectations for GDP growth and inflation. As
a consequence, the introduction of the variable
“fiscal balance” in this model is aimed at
exclusively grasping changes in the relative
supply of Treasuries and, in principle, does not
convey any additional information on the
expected future path of interest rates.
Therefore, the role of the fiscal variable is
similar to that of official foreign purchases of
Treasuries, i.e. changes in the relative supply
of Treasuries and bonds. Fiscal balances are
used as a percentage of GDP. In particular, the
estimated long-term relationship will be
checked to see if it holds or not for the period in
which the strong accumulation of reserves has
taken place (from 1999 onwards). Last but not
least, the estimation technique used is
Generalised Least Squares in order to correct
the autocorrelation in the residuals that would
be obtained if Ordinary Least Squares were
applied.
The long-run equation51 in our model is given
by:
US 10yr yield = a0 + a1 monetary stance
+ a2 inflation expectations
+ a3 US public balance + a residual
The results are shown in Table 1.
In a second step, several measures were
included to gauge the impact of Asian reserve
accumulation on long term interest rates. The
variables considered are Japanese net
purchases of Treasuries, aggregate Japanese
plus Chinese plus Malaysian net purchases of
Treasuries, and total Foreign Official net
purchases.52
None of the long-run equations show any
statistically significant impact of any of the
50 See Iankova, Lefeuvre and Teiletche (2004), Artus (2005),
Moëc and Frey (2005) and Deutsche Bank (2005). Of these
works, the approach presented by Moëc and Frey seems
particularly appealing.
51 The Fed funds rate is used as a measure for the actual stance
of monetary policy and the consumer expenditure index
(core) as a measure of inflation expectations. Public balances
are measured as a percentage of GDP. The baseline time span
considered is from 1994 onwards, though wider horizons (the
widest begins in 1990) were also considered and obtained
similar results.
52 The data are provided by the Treasury International Capital
System (TICS).57
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measures of the Asian reserve accumulation
on US yields. In other words, Asian purchases
of Treasuries do not add any additional
information to explain interest rate levels to
that contained in the sum of monetary stance,
inflation expectations and public deficits in the
extended time-horizon considered.
Afterwards we used the error correction model
technique to estimate a short-run relationship.
The results support the view that Foreign
Official net purchases of Treasuries help to
explain the changes of US ten-year yields
at a 95% confidence level and that Asian
purchases, mainly because of Japanese
purchases, are statistically significant at an
85% confidence level.
According to the coefficients obtained for the
extended period 1994-2004, current long-term
government yields are around 80 to 85 basis
points below that suggested by fair value
estimates. Equilibrium long-term interest rates
in the United States would be in the range of
5.15% to 5.25%. However, Asian official
purchases of Treasuries obtained from TICS
data are not responsible for this misalignment
although, according to the short-term
relationship estimated, they help to explain
changes in yields.
The exercise is repeated for a shorter time span
(1999-2004) just after the Asian crisis when,
among other things, the strong pace of
accumulation of foreign reserves by Asian
countries took place. The results are shown in
Table 2.
Since 1999, the estimation of the model has
shown a structural change in the determination
of long-term interest rates in the United States.
The public deficit and the consumer price index
variables are not statistically significant,
whereas other factors, apart from official
interest rates, have become more important
because the coefficient estimated for the
constant term of the equation is higher and
statistically significant at a 95% confidence
Table 1 Regressions for 1994-2004
(dependent variable: US ten year Treasury bond yield)
Source: Calculations provided by Banco de España.
Notes: USBB stands for public budget balance, FEDFUNDS stands for the quarterly average of Fed funds, PCE core stands for the
core component of the expenditure consumer price index, LD BOND10Y stands for the first lag in the ten-year interest rate, D. stands





Baseline Japan Asia Fgn. official inst.
Variable Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run
USBBs -0.140 3) -0.139 3) -0.135 2) -0.140 3)
FEDFUNDS 0.516 3) 0.515 3) 0.507 3) 0.502 3)
PCE_core 0.764 3) 0.764 3) 0.775 3) 0.743 3)
LD.BOND10Y 0.256 0.305 0.272 0.280
D.USBBs 0.044 0.112 0.096 0.043
D.FEDFUNDS 0.680 3) 0.669 3) 0.662 3) 0.584 3)
D.PCE_core 0.077 0.104 0.211 0.025
L.residual -0.919 3) -0.956 3) -0.953 3) -0.854 3)
NP -0.006 -0.036 -0.112
D.NP -0.195 1) -0.163 1) -1.196 3)
CONSTANT 1.888 3) 0.000 1.896 3) -0.005 1.932  3) 0.001 2.015 4) 0.003
OBS. 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
R-SQUARE 0.718 0.426 0.717 0.477 0.715 0.467 0.710 0.437
ADJ. R-SQUARE 0.697 0.351 0.688 0.393 0.686 0.380 0.680 0.345
DURBIN-WATSON 1.607 1.726 1.604 1.645 1.597 1.685 1.582 1.765
SCHWARZ I.C. 51.922 48.217 55.704 49.421 55.643 49.742 55.272 50.64058
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level. This result, with all due caveats, suggests
that a structural change (whose underlying
factors are not identified) in the relationship
between Treasury yields, public deficits and
the consumer price index – a measure of
inflation – has taken place. The results are
robust when the time horizon is shortened
further (from 2000 onwards) and the residuals
show no autocorrelation. In a second step,
when different measures of Asian Treasury
purchases were added again, the estimates
obtained did not support the view that Asian
purchases of Treasuries were responsible for
this structural change in the long-term
relationship.
When using the error correction model
technique to estimate the short-run
relationship, the results strongly suggest that
Asian purchases of Treasuries have an impact
on changes in long-term Treasury yields,
mainly because of changes in Japanese
Treasury purchases. Compared with the
previous results, Asian purchases become more
important in explaining changes in yields,
at a 95% confidence level, whereas the
significance of the aggregate of foreign official
net purchases of Treasuries is lower than in the
extended time horizon.
According to the newly estimated coefficients
confined to the 1999-2004 period, US ten-year
yields in the first quarter of 2005 were in the
range of 40 to 50 basis points below that
predicted by the model. However, the estimates
do not support the view that this relatively
modest downward bias in the levels is
explained by purchases of Treasuries by Asian
monetary authorities (alone). They become
highly significant in explaining the short-term
dynamics but not the levels.
4 A MODEL TO EXPLAIN THE IMPACT OF
ASIAN RESERVE ACCUMULATION ON
THREE-YEAR TREASURY YIELDS
To better grasp the impact of Asian reserve
accumulation on US Treasury yields, the model
is rerun by substituting the three-year yield for
the ten-year yield in both the extended time
horizon (from 1994 onwards) and the shorter
time span (from 1999 onwards). To the extent
Table 2 Regressions for 1999-2004
(dependent variable: US ten year Treasury bond yield)





Baseline Japan Asia Fgn. official inst.
Variable Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run
USBBs 0.046 0.075 0.081 0.043
FEDFUNDS 0.276 3) 0.206 1) 0.180 0.251 3)
PCE_core 0.369 0.264 0.360 0.265
LD.BOND10Y 0.395 1) 0.297 0.251 0.453 2)
D.USBBs -0.056 0.128 0.139 -0.026
D.FEDFUNDS 0.332 2) 0.252 0.263 2) 0.256 1)
D.PCE_core 0.321 0.265 0.549 1) 0.244
L.residual -0.767 3) -0.771 3) -0.788 3) -0.697 3)
NP -0.230 -0.254 -0.170
D.NP -0.441 3) -0.432 3) -0.307 1)
CONSTANT 3.510 3) 0.021 4.018 3) 0.046 4.000 3) 0.053 3.790 3) 0.029
OBS. 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-SQUARE 0.761 0.459 0.761 0.534 0.765 0.526 0.758 0.483
ADJ. R-SQUARE 0.726 0.309 0.711 0.369 0.716 0.359 0.707 0.300
DURBIN-WATSON 1.661 2.012 1.450 1.819 1.507 1.869 1.599 2.027
SCHWARZ I.C. 24.119 26.241 25.664 24.445 25.069 24.331 26.652 28.31459
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to which central bank portfolios are thought to
be biased towards short-term maturities, the
impact of a change in the relative supply of
Treasuries (because of a captive demand from
foreign central banks) is likely to be more
important in this part of the yield curve than for
long-term bonds. The results are shown in
Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3 Regressions for 1994-2004
(dependent variable: US ten year Treasury bond yield)





Baseline Japan Asia Fgn. official inst.
Variable Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run
USBBs -0.082 -0.075 -0.071 -0.089
FEDFUNDS 0.810 3) 0.790 3) 0.777 3) 0.798 3)
PCE_core 0.635 3) 0.637 3) 0.674 3) 0.610 3)
LD.BOND3Y 0.168 0.216 0.175 0.195
D.USBBs 0.046 0.128 0.125 0.038
D.FEDFUNDS 1.081 3) 1.034 3) 1.016 3) 0.970 3)
D.PCE_core 0.061 0.030 0.189 0.001
L.residual -1.048 3) -1.037 3) -1.016 3) -0.985 3)
NP -0.123 -0.143 -0.147
D.NP -0.269 3) -0.263 3) -0.230 3)
CONSTANT 0.268 -0.007 0.389 -0.010 0.410 -0.005 0.384 -0.003
OBS. 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
R-SQUARE 0.826 0.561 0.818 0.596 0.816 0.596 0.816 0.565
ADJ. R-SQUARE 0.812 0.504 0.799 0.531 0.797 0.530 0.797 0.495
DURBIN-WATSON 1.715 1.722 1.678 1.629 1.678 1.669 1.688 1.748
SCHWARZ I.C. 53.364 52.406 56.703 53.343 56.274 52.847 56.455 55.201
Table 4 Regressions for 1999-2004
(dependent variable: US ten year Treasury bond yield)





Baseline Japan Asia Fgn. official inst.
Variable Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run
USBBs 0.044 0.096 0.103 0.044
FEDFUNDS 0.644 3) 0.526 3) 0.492 3) 0.623 3)
PCE_core 0.355 0.255 0.422 0.286
LD.BOND3Y -0.021 0.194 0.110 0.029
D.USBBs 0.036 0.163 1) 0.184 2) 0.030
D.FEDFUNDS 0.819 3) 0.621 3) 0.660 3) 0.749 3)
D.PCE_core 0.150 0.138 0.541 0.101
L.residual -0.830 1) -0.799 2) -0.828 2) -0.806 1)
NP -0.361 2) -0.373 2) -0.126
D.NP -0.538 3) -0.533 3) -0.185
CONSTANT 1.406 0.019 2.148 2) 0.050 2.058 2) 0.051 1.617 2) 0.020
OBS. 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-SQUARE 0.877 0.522 0.860 0.651 0.858 0.644 0.871 0.524
ADJ. R-SQUARE 0.859 0.389 0.831 0.527 0.828 0.519 0.843 0.357
DURBIN-WATSON 1.704 1.861 1.378 1.742 1.490 1.885 1.682 1.918
SCHWARZ I.C. 28.909 32.228 28.713 28.200 28.231 28.278 31.811 35.18960
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Nor surprisingly, the influence of the Fed funds
on Treasury yields now becomes greater than it
was in the ten-year yield estimation, at the
expense of the role of the public deficit
variable. With regard to foreign official
purchases, they do not play a role in explaining
three-year US Treasury interest rate levels in
the extended horizon model, but become highly
significant (at 95% confidence) in the short-
term equation, which means that they do help to
explain the dynamics of interest rate changes.
What it is particularly relevant for the aim of
the study is that, for the latter period, estimates
are highly supportive of Asian purchases
(mainly because of Japanese purchases) having
an impact on the short-end of the Treasury yield
curve in terms of both levels and changes in
levels. Net official purchases by Japan, for
example, become statistically significant in
explaining the low levels of three-year
Treasury yields. Furthermore, changes in net
purchases are also statistically significant in
explaining changes in yields. Indeed, when
combining the results, evidence can be found
that Japanese purchases have played a role in
explaining the low levels and dynamics of
Treasury yields.
The short-term model shows no autocorrelation
of the residuals which support the statistical
significance of the coefficient estimated.
Neither is there evidence of autocorrelation of
the residuals in the long-term model, although
admittedly the Durbin-Watson in the latter is
inconclusive.53 According to the estimates,
Japanese purchases of US Treasuries, at the
time of the greatest net purchases, might have
had an impact of 65 basis points on three-year
US Treasury yields. The fact that no impact was
found in the ten-year maturity is consistent
with the principle of imperfect substitution
among US Treasuries of different maturities
along the yield curve.
5 IMPACT ON OTHER ASSET PRICES
This section tries to assess whether the demand
for US securities by Asian central banks had
any relevant implication on asset prices other
than US Treasuries.54 The analysis focuses
mainly on US corporate and US agency debt
and very briefly touches on the equity segment.
Asian central bank purchases of US securities
can have an impact on these asset prices via two
channels: i) the direct consequences of Asian
central bank purchases of agencies, corporate
bonds and equity in the relative supply in these
segments, and ii) the indirect effects of Asian
central bank purchases of US Treasuries in the
agency, corporate and equity markets.55 The
first consequences stem from the effects the
demand for US agency and corporate debt and
equity by Asian central banks can have on the
level and dynamics of the prices of these assets
in their own markets. Regarding US corporate
and agency debt, and equity, the possible direct
impact of the captive demand arising from
Asian central banks purchases does not seem
to be very clear. The amount of agency and
corporate bonds and equity bought by official
foreigners is still small, both in absolute terms
and when looking at their share in their
respective markets. Adding to the direct
impact, there can be second-round effects. The
indirect consequences would reflect the role
US Treasury debt plays in other asset markets.
On the one hand, agency and corporate debt
markets have developments in the Treasury
market as a benchmark and their respective
53 The results are in line with those obtained by Kasman and
Malik (2004), even if the data source used to account for
Asian reserve accumulation (TIC data) is different to theirs
(Fed holdings data).
54 Besides the asset prices reviewed, the fact that, in the equity
market, foreign official purchases have a very small weight
in total foreign purchases (2% on average since January
1994) should also be taken into account. According to
holdings data, foreign investors have only 9% of US equity
and official institutions represent 7% of this (so they
represent only 0.6% of the US equity market). Furthermore,
the assumption made earlier that total official purchases are
a good proxy for Asian central bank purchases no longer
holds in the equity segment, where the share of Asian
institutions in purchases and holdings of US equity is very
limited.
55 As no data on official foreign purchases by type of asset with
a country (or regional) breakdown are available, purchases
by all official institutions were used, as a proxy to Asian
central bank purchases. The error induced by including
official investors from other areas should not be significant,
as monetary authorities from areas other than Asia have a
tiny share of official purchases and holdings of US
securities.61
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yields are highly positively correlated. On the
other hand, if we assume that the different
markets are not segmented, an increase in
purchases of treasuries may, in theory, divert
investment from other markets.
CORPORATE DEBT
In the corporate segment, foreign official
purchases make up only a small proportion of
total foreign purchases56 (2% on average since
January 1994). In terms of holdings, official
institutions hold only 2% of total foreign
holdings of corporate bonds; furthermore,
foreign-owned corporate debt represents 16%
of US corporate bonds outstanding.57 Thus, the
potential direct impact of foreign official
purchases of corporate bonds on prices is rather
small. Official investors’ behaviour is usually
closely monitored by market participants as the
former are often viewed as “special” agents
that have unusual utility functions and can
produce specific impacts on markets. In order
to assess if the behaviour of official investors
can, in fact, be differentiated, one can try to
identify some drivers of official and non-
official corporate purchases by computing
correlation coefficients.58 Two different
periods were considered: since 1994 and since
1999. Actual evidence of the existence of
different factors playing a major role in the
dynamics of these two variables is limited. In
particular since 1999, correlation coefficients
between the US dollar, corporate yields,
corporate spreads and risk appetite, and official
and non-official corporate purchases by
foreigners are very similar.59 Comparable
calculations were made using shorter
maturities (two and three years) for corporate
and Treasury yields and the conclusions are
very similar. Another approach to test whether
official purchases have a relevant role in
explaining corporate debt price developments
is by running a regression. By running simple
regressions, based mainly on market data,
little evidence could be found that “official
corporate purchases” are statistically
significant.60 The very small share of total
corporate debt demand held by foreign official
purchases may explain this result.61 Another
hypothetical impact is the effect of the low
interest rate environment on the soundness of
US companies. The generalised improvement
in the balance sheets of many US companies
has almost certainly had a positive impact on
corporate spreads. This is, however, more
difficult to model and goes beyond the scope of
this note.
AGENCY DEBT
Regarding the agency segment, official foreign
purchases do seem to hold a greater share of
foreign activity than in the corporate market.62
According to TIC data, official purchases
represent, on average, 12% of all foreign
purchases since January 2003 and 15% since
January 1994. However, their weight in the
agency market is still small. According to
Treasury holdings data, in June 2003 official
holdings were 31% of total foreign holdings
and foreign-owned US government agency
bonds represented around 11% of outstanding
debt (so they represent 3.5% of outstanding US
government agency bonds).
56 Data on flows are from the US Treasury’s International
Capital System (TICS).
57 As of June 2003, US Treasury Annual Survey of Foreign
Holdings of US Securities, June 2004.
58 Correlation coefficients between official and non-official
corporate purchases and an effective exchange rate index of
the US dollar, ten-year corporate yields, spreads between
ten-year corporate yields and Treasury yields, and a proxy
for investors risk appetite (the Global Risk Appetite Index as
computed by CSFB) were computed.
59 Correlation coefficients must be carefully interpreted and
used prudently as financial data usually do not fully comply
with normality conditions (see Lehman Brothers, 2005).
60 Interestingly, there is some evidence that “official Treasury
purchases” might have some influence on corporate spreads
(this could be justified by the indirect impact of the
alternative investments argument).
61 It should be highlighted that the simple models run, based
mainly on market data, tend to give poor results and are not
statistically very robust.
62 To monitor this segment there are two main data sources: US
Treasury TIC data and Custody Holdings at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. Comparing changes in the
amount of agency bonds held in custody and purchases by
official foreign institutions (TIC data), the two sources show
great differences both in terms of amounts and trends. Even
when smoothing for yearly data, different trends can be
identified. According to UBS (2005), the Fed data are
“considered to be more reliable at identifying trends among
official accounts”. However, custody data have only been
available since 2000, limiting their use for a comparative
analysis between the period since 1994 and the period after
the increasing reserve accumulation process took place.62
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First, several correlation coefficients were
computed between official and non-official
purchases, and an effective exchange rate index
of the US dollar, ten-year agency yields, ten-
year agency spreads and a proxy for investors’
risk appetite63, trying to identify whether
official and non-official foreign investors
exhibit different behaviour.
Correlation coefficients computed with data
since 1994 do not point to different behaviour
from the two kinds of investors. Correlations
with data from 2000 are not so uniform.
Regarding agency yields and agency spreads, it
is interesting to highlight that, although data
from the TIC could lead to the conclusion that
there is different behaviour, if we use the
custody data as a proxy to official institutions,
the correlation coefficients became negative
(as with TIC non-official purchases).64 All in
all, there is only limited actual evidence of
differentiated behaviour on the part of official
and non-official investors.
In a second step several regressions were run,
relating agency spreads with risk appetite,
growth indicators, and demand and supply on
agency and Treasury markets. These simple
regressions based on market data did not entail
the use of advanced econometric methods. The
resulting evidence is not enough to support the
view that official purchases of agencies are
statistically significant in explaining agency
spread behaviour (using both long and short-
term yields).65 Developments seen recently in
the agency market, with several accounting
problems arising in the main government-
sponsored enterprises, may also have
introduced some instability into the dynamics
of this segment.
ANNEX 7
THE FINANCING OF THE US CURRENT ACCOUNT
DEFICIT: A SHORT REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
AND SOME EVIDENCE66
1 BACKGROUND
“The counterpart to current account surpluses
in Asia and the purchases of foreign exchange
assets denominated in US dollars has been
large US current account deficits. Persistent
deficits are reflected in a negative US
international investment position, implying the
United States has become a net debtor country.
While these imbalances should in principle
reflect the use of financial markets to allocate
world savings towards the most profitable
investment opportunities, it is likely that there
is a limit to the amount of debt that a given
country can issue before international investors
begin to worry about its willingness to repay
the debt. If the country in question is the United
States, which issues the international reserve
currency, then the rapid accumulation of assets
denominated in the reserve currency might
result in nominal exchange rate swings that
would be much larger than those needed for an
orderly rebalancing of asset positions. This
could have negative implications for
international financial stability.” (King 2005).
The quotation shows how the growing US
current account deficit has become a source of
concern for policy-makers, and raises the
question about what could happen if
international investors were to reduce their
purchases of assets denominated in US dollars.
This annex is organized as follows. In Section 2
a few selected contributions on the
sustainability of the US current account deficit
are reviewed, while section 3 contains a
63 Global Risk Appetite Index computed by Credit Suisse First
Boston.
64 The conclusions are very similar if shorter maturities (two
and three years) are used for agency and Treasury yields.
65 These conclusions should be used carefully as the simple
models run tend to give poor results and are not statistically
very robust.
66 By F. Comelli (European Central Bank) and M. Ghirga
(Banca d’Italia).63
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descriptive analysis of the data on the financing
of the US current account deficit.
2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, AND LINKS
WITH CURRENT POLICY ISSUES
Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) have
developed a partial equilibrium portfolio
model of exchange rate and current account
determination. They assume imperfect
substitutability both between US and foreign
goods and between US and foreign assets,
which allows the presence of goods and
portfolio shifts. In their model, the dollar is
predicted to depreciate further in the absence of
any unexpected events. This is because further
shifts in investors’ preferences towards dollar
assets would provide only temporary relief for
the currency, as higher demand for US assets
would lead to an initial dollar appreciation, but
the consequent deteriorating competitiveness
of the United States would widen the current
account deficit and increase the accumulation
of foreign debt. Thus, the authors consider that
the argument according to which the United
States – thanks to the attractiveness of its assets
– can keep running large current account
deficits with no effect on the dollar appears to
overlook the long-term consequences of a large
accumulation of external liabilities. Similarly,
an increase in US interest rates would
temporarily strengthen the dollar, but
eventually the depreciation needed to restore
equilibrium in the current account would be
even larger, both because the accumulation of
foreign liabilities would accelerate and
because eventually the United States would
need to finance a larger flow of interest
payments abroad as both interest rates and debt
would be higher. The policy conclusion is that
fiscal consolidation is needed in order to
induce lower interest rates in the United States.
This would allow the potentially higher interest
rates required by foreigners to invest in the
United States to be offset in the presence of
dollar depreciation. In other words, fiscal
tightening is needed to reduce the current
account deficit, but it is not a substitute for
dollar depreciation – both are needed. This
policy recommendation is very similar to that
formulated by the IMF (2005a). In the April
2005 issue of the World Economic Outlook, the
IMF suggests that a reduction in global
imbalances will require domestic demand to
grow more slowly than GDP in the United
States, and to grow faster than GDP in surplus
countries. This will likely need to be
accompanied by a further depreciation of the
dollar over the medium term, a tightening of US
fiscal policy, and appreciation in a number of
emerging Asia economies.
Gourinchas and Rey (2004) highlight the
importance of valuation effects through
exchange rate changes in improving the net
external assets position of the United States.
They find that, historically, an average of 31%
of the international adjustment of the United
States is realised through valuation effects,
while 56% is realised through movements in
future net exports. Therefore, valuation effects
can be relevant for the external adjustment
process. By absorbing about 31% of the
external imbalances, valuation effects
substantially relax the external budget
constraint of the United States. At short to
medium horizons, most of the adjustment goes
through asset returns, while at longer horizons
it occurs via the trade balance. It follows that
the dynamics of the exchange rate play a major
role in the model since it has the dual role of
changing the differential in rates of return
between assets and liabilities denominated in
different currencies and also of affecting future
net exports. The main policy implication of
the paper is that, as financial globalisation
increases, the United States could be able
to run larger and more substantial external
imbalances, provided foreign investors are
willing to accumulate further holdings of
depreciating dollar-denominated liabilities.
By contrast, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)
argue that it is problematic to rely only on
valuation effects to address adjustment
problems. Even for those countries for which a
one-off surprise devaluation may indeed
generate a positive valuation effect that64
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improves the net foreign asset position, such a
move would involve a reputation cost: foreign
investors in the future would require a larger
premium in order to compensate for the risk of
subsequent devaluations. The classic time-
consistency problem arises, and the standard
policy recommendation is that policy-makers
should take steps to commit to not using the
devaluation option as a form of capital levy.
While the severity of this problem is one of the
underlying factors behind the prevalence of
liability dollarisation and short-maturity debt
among the emerging market economies, it may
also be relevant for debtor industrial
economies.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) argue that the
widening of the US current account deficit may
potentially trigger a sharp depreciation of the
dollar. Unlike Gourinchas and Rey (2005), the
authors focus their discussion not on the
consequences of growing international capital
market integration, but on the relative price
movements needed to preserve goods-market
equilibrium during the current account
adjustment. The authors find that, in a general
equilibrium framework, a rebalancing of the
US current account deficit may involve a trade-
weighted dollar depreciation of at least 20% in
the baseline scenario, while in a more extreme
scenario the trade-weighted depreciation could
amount to 40%. The policy implication is that
the US current account adjustment would be
achieved through the trade channel and not
through valuation effects. The growing
integration of world capital markets may at
most delay the US current account adjustment,
but it is likely that a sharp closing of the current
account will eventually lead to large exchange
rate adjustments.
Debelle and Galati (2005) examine episodes of
current account adjustments in industrial
countries over the last 30 years. They found
that adjustments were generally associated
with large declines in domestic growth and
exchange rate depreciation. From an ex-post
perspective they also found that the bulk of the
financial account adjustment is achieved
through a change in private sector capital
flows. The US constitutes an important
exception. A comparison of the current account
reversal experienced by the United States in
1987 with episodes of current account
adjustment in other industrial countries shows
that the role played by foreign official flows
was much more significant in the US
adjustment than in other countries. Finally,
since the dollar is an international reserve
currency, this implies that the US international
investment position can benefit from positive
valuation effects on net foreign liabilities.
Summing up, the analysis of Debelle and Galati
suggests that, in view of a potential current
account adjustment in the United States,
foreign official capital flows can play an
important role in the adjustment process.
Finally, according to the Bank for International
Settlements (2004b), an empirical analysis of
the financial flows associated with current
account adjustments since the mid-1970s
reveals sizeable swings in a number of
categories of capital flows during adjustment
episodes. Nonetheless, an analysis of the
experience in the United States around 1987
suggests that the pattern of adjustment of the
present US external imbalance cannot be
predicted with confidence. But changes in the
composition of financial flows into the United
States might suggest that the private sector is
becoming less willing to finance the US current
account deficit, and this could imply that an
adjustment of the current account deficit might
be happening sooner rather than later.
Recently the policy debate has focused on
valuation effects on the US international
investment position (IIP) and on the possible
erosion of home bias in financial markets.
Gourinchas and Rey’s predictions seem to be in
line with the data released by the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) on the US IIP at the
end of 2004. According to the BEA, the US IIP
at the end of 2004 was USD 2.54 trillion, up
from USD 2.37 trillion at the end of 2003.
Valuation gains (USD 415 billion) limited the
deterioration of the US IIP by offsetting most
of the increase in net capital inflows (USD 59065
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billion). Specifically, valuation gains were
accounted for by asset price changes of around
USD 145 billion and by exchange rate effects
of around USD 270 billion. Asset price changes
reflected relative underperformance of the US
stock market compared with major foreign
stock markets, which raised the value of US-
owned equity holdings abroad more than the
value of foreign-owned equity holdings in the
United States. Exchange rate effects were due
to the nominal depreciation of the US dollar
against most foreign currencies. The dollar
nominal depreciation raised the dollar value of
US-owned assets abroad, which are mainly
denominated in foreign currencies (while
foreign-owned assets in the United States are
denominated in US dollars). Naturally,
everything else being equal, a potential
nominal appreciation of the US dollar during
2005 would lead to valuation losses for the IIP.
According to past internal work, the expected
rise in US interest rates and its interaction with
increasing stock of foreign-owned US debt
would have a significantly negative effect on
the US balance on income in the coming years.
In a reasonably conservative scenario, the
analysis shows that the US balance on income
could become negative by 2006 and contribute
by 0.4% of GDP to the US current account
deficit in 2007.
The issue of home bias has been discussed
recently by the IMF (2005b and d).
Specifically, the increase in foreign holdings of
US liabilities since 1990 was motivated both by
growth of US financial markets and by an
erosion of the home bias, so that investors have
become increasingly willing to hold more
foreign assets relative to domestic assets.
However, according to IMF staff calculations,
global asset portfolios do not appear to be
significantly overweight in US assets, relative
to the United States’ benchmark share in
an internationally diversified portfolio. This
implies that the exposure of foreign investors
to US assets may still rise and that the US IIP
may deteriorate again, possibly offsetting
potential positive valuation effects.
3 A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF US CURRENT
ACCOUNT DEFICIT FINANCING
Table 1 shows data from the Flow of Funds
Accounts of the United States, compiled by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. The table shows that the US current
account deficit in 2004 was USD 641 billion,
equivalent to approximately 5.5% of GDP. The
counterpart of the US current account deficit
is the deteriorating international investment
position of the United States, which at the end
of 2004 was equal to USD -630.8 billion.
Therefore, in 2004 net capital inflows from
foreign investors were USD 630.8 billion,
while the remaining USD 11.8 billion
accounted for the statistical discrepancy
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Foreign income from
the United States 1,137.2 1,217.7 1,352.2 1,430.4 1,586.0 1,875.6 1,725.7 1,764.4 1,886.1 2,217.0
Foreign outlays to
the United States 1,046.2 1,117.3 1,242.1 1,243 1,312.1 1,479.0 1,355.3 1,306.8 1,375.3 1,575.7
Total savings 91.0 100.4 110.1 187.4 273.9 396.6 370.4 457.6 510.8 641.3
Net acquisition of financial assets 419.2 521.8 597.3 393.4 708.5 963.0 657.7 741.7 783.0 1,190.1
Net increase in liabilities 333.8 384.8 377.0 318.4 476.8 486.7 242.7 172.7 240.4 559.4
Non-produced financial assets 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Total investment 85.6 136.9 220.2 75.0 231.7 476.0 415.1 569.0 542.8 630.8
Discrepancy 6.5 -36.0 -109.1 113.1 47.0 -78.9 -43.6 -110.1 -28.8 11.8
Memo:
US current account deficit 91.0 100.4 110.2 187.4 273.9 396.6 370.4 457.7 510.9 641.3
Table 1 Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States and the Rest of the World – Federal
Reserve System
(USD billions; March 2005)
Source: Federal Reserve System.66
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between the current account and financial
account balances.67
Chart 13 shows the amounts of net financial
investment made by foreign investors in the
United States from 1995 onwards. The amount
of net financial investment by foreigners
measures the amount of net private capital
inflows that the United States has been
receiving from foreign investors and is
expressed as the difference between the net
acquisition of financial assets by foreign
investors and their net liabilities. The United
States has been progressively receiving
growing net capital inflows from foreign
investors. Chart 14 shows that in 2004 foreign
investors were net buyers of credit-market
instruments, which include open market paper,
US Treasury securities, US Government
Agency bonds, corporate bonds and loans
to US corporate businesses. From 2000 until
2004, credit market instruments appear to have
been the preferred asset category of foreign
investors. During the same period, foreign
investors were also net buyers of cash-type
instruments, which include net interbank
assets, bank deposits and security repurchase
agreements. The data also show that, in net
terms, foreign investors were net sellers of US
equities in 2003 and 2004. Finally the chart
Chart 14 Financial investment by foreigners
in the United States: breakdown by asset
classes
(USD billions)
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Chart 13 Net financial investment by
foreigners in the United States
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67 These data are broadly consistent with the balance of
payments data produced by the US Department of
Commerce.
shows the amount of miscellaneous assets,
which include direct investments, bank loans
and trade credits.
In terms of the category of investors, most
of the US current account deficit financing
was provided by foreign private investors.
Nevertheless, foreign official investors have
been progressively more involved in financing
the US current account deficit. Specifically,
from 1999 onwards foreign official investors
purchased growing amounts of US securities,
in particular Treasury and Government agency
bonds. In 2004 foreign official investors
purchased a total amount of USD 290 billion in
government securities, which constitutes a
substantial increase compared with their 2003
purchases of USD 194.6 billion.67
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